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I. INTRODUCTION
The pejorative "irrational" is used to describe many different de-
fects in legal reasoning. If taken literally, it is an accusation that leg-
islators who pass an irrational law or judges who agree to an
irrational opinion are "not endowed with reason or understanding,"'
or are "void of reason or understanding; as, brutes are irrational ani-
mals."2 When the Supreme Court strikes down a law using the "ra-
tional basis" test, though, the criticism of the legislature is neither
that personal nor that extreme. 3 In applying the requirement that a
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
1. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?
book=dictionary&va=irrational (last visited Feb. 14, 2006).
2. THE ON-LINE MEDICAL DICTIONARY, http://cancerweb.ncl.ac.uk/cgi-bin/omd?irra-
tional (last visited Feb. 14, 2006).
3. The first time the Supreme Court used the phrase "rational basis" in a constitu-
tional test was 1914, when it declared, "The State has a wide range of discretion
with respect to establishing classes for the purpose of imposing revenue taxes,
and its laws upon the subject are not to be set aside as discriminatory unless it
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"classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legiti-
mate state interest,"4 the concept of rationality is not meant to be
taken at face value.
In reality, the conclusion of "irrationality" reflects a wide range of
possible disagreements. It is not uncommon, for example, for a Su-
preme Court Justice to describe as "irrational" a situation where he or
she believes that two actions cause the same problem, but only one is
prohibited. Take Justice Stevens, who said it was "simply irrational"
for a state to ban partial birth abortion procedures yet permit other
forms of abortion which were "equally gruesome."5 Similarly, Justice
O'Connor termed the use of different standards of proof for commit-
ting the mentally ill than for committing the mentally retarded
"irrational."6
Other times, Justices have used the word "irrational" to criticize
decisions which they see as self-contradictory, such as permitting ac-
tions which cause the very harm sought to be prevented. Justice
Scalia found it "irrational" that "seeking to harm an abortion clinic's
business through persuasion is indeed unlawful in South Carolina,"
yet a court issued an injunction that would "permit such harm so long
as it is inflicted at a distance of 12 feet from the driveway[.]" 7
Still another use of the word "irrational" describes situations
where there is no reasoning at all to support a decision. Thus, the
Court has stated that regulation of even non-fundamental rights can
violate the Due Process Clause when the restrictions imposed are "un-
deniably irrational as unsupported by any imaginable rationale."8
Most people would agree that, absent some other facts, it is irra-
tional to treat functionally similar cases differently, or to permit the
clearly appears that there is no rational basis for the classification." Singer Sew-
ing Mach. Co. v. Brickell, 233 U.S. 304, 316 (1914) (emphasis added). The Court's
first use of the word "rational" in a constitutional standard was four years earlier
in Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910):
"That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another may not con-
stitute a denial of due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the law,
it is only essential that there shall be some rational connection between the fact
proved and the ultimate fact presumed ...." Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
4. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
5. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 946 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring).
6. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 334 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
7. Cloer v. Gynecology Clinic, Inc., 528 U.S. 1099, 1101 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
8. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 766 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring); see
also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1031 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Ilt is
irrational to assume that a person is not qualified to vote or to serve as a juror
simply because she has brown hair or brown skin. It is neither irrational, nor
invidious, however, to assume that a black resident of a particular community is
a Democrat if reliable statistical evidence discloses that 97% of the blacks in that
community vote in Democratic primary elections.").
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very harm you are trying to prevent, or to act without the slightest
justification. While these principles may not be controversial, decid-
ing when they have occurred will usually be contentious. What ap-
pears to be irrationally differential treatment to one person may well
be viewed as a valid distinction to another. For example, in Romer v.
Evans,9 the Supreme Court ruled that an amendment to the Colorado
Constitution prohibiting all state and local bans of discrimination
against gays and lesbians violated the Equal Protection Clause. Jus-
tice Anthony Kennedy, speaking for the Court, noted the law's "sheer
breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the
amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the
class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state in-
terests."' 0 By contrast, Justice Antonin Scalia argued in dissent that
the law was indeed rational:
If it is rational to criminalize the conduct, surely it is rational to deny special
favor and protection to those with a self-avowed tendency or desire to engage
in the conduct. Indeed, where criminal sanctions are not involved, homosex-
ual "orientation" is an acceptable stand-in for homosexual conduct. 1 1
Justices frequently disagree over whether a decision is supported
by a legitimate rationale or not. To term a decision "irrational" in this
setting is really a subjective determination. It is more of a statement
that, "I disagree with the validity of your premise," or "I disagree with
your belief that a given conclusion follows from a particular premise."
This is far less insulting, and more likely accurate, than a literal
charge of irrationality which implies, "No logical person could agree
with your reasoning process."
Perhaps the most obvious example of "irrationality" would be to
declare simultaneously that something both did and did not exist, or
that a proposition is simultaneously true and not true.12 Nonetheless,
decision-makers sometimes willfully create such contradictory deci-
sions in order to avoid the consequences of consistency. Consider the
case of a prohibition-era jury finding a defendant not guilty of unlaw-
ful possession of six glasses of bootleg liquor, but guilty of maintaining
a nuisance by keeping those same six glasses of liquor for sale. 13 Ac-
9. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
10. Id. at 632 (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court ruled
that it was not rational to criminalize homosexual activity in Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
12. This is comparable to the rule of logic known as "the law of the excluded middle,"
which states that a given proposition is either true or untrue. STEPHEN F.
BARKER, THE ELEMENTS OF LOGIC 120 (3d ed. 1980); see also, e.g., Tesoro Petro-
leum Corp. v. State, 42 P.3d 531, 545 (Alaska 2002) (Mathews, J., dissenting)
(stating that a worker performing a single task cannot be both an employee and
an independent contractor); Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., 898 P.2d
680, 686 (Mont. 1995) (stating that "coal and gas are mutually exclusive terms").
13. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932).
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cording to Oliver Wendell Holmes, the verdicts were inconsistent, but
could be explained under the theory that the jury was deliberately vot-
ing so as to be lenient to a defendant they believed was guilty:
The most that can be said in such cases is that the verdict shows that either in
the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions,
but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt.
We interpret the acquittal as no more than their assumption of a power which
they had no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through
lenity. 14
Irrespective of the judge's instructions and the obvious illogic, the jury
essentially manipulated the system so that a guilty party was pun-
ished, but not too severely. The irrationality of inconsistent verdicts
then was not a failure of logic, but a deliberate device to reach a de-
sired end. Theoretically at least, such "illogic" can be avoided by em-
ploying special verdicts, or by requiring that a jury deciding multiple
counts only convict a defendant on a compound crime if it convicts on
the predicate offense as well.15 However, because jury manipulation
is not the sole source of irrational outcomes, these devices cannot pre-
vent illogical judgments entirely.
Irrationality also results from simple human error. The Supreme
Court was probably guilty of this type of irrationality when it decided
a trilogy of cases involving the applicability of the First Amendment to
private shopping centers. In the 1968 decision of Amalgamated Food
Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,16 the Court
ruled that a labor union had a First Amendment right to picket within
a privately owned shopping center. 17 Four years later in Lloyd Corp.
v. Tanner,18 without overruling Logan Valley, the Court held that
anti-war protesters did not have a First Amendment right to dis-
tribute handbills in a private shopping center.1 9 Since the First
Amendment's principle of content-neutrality suggests the Court
should have permitted both types of speech or else permitted neither,
these cases were in direct conflict with each other. Another four years
later, in Hudgens v. NLRB,20 the Court formally overruled Logan Val-
ley, admitting: "[T]he reasoning of the Court's opinion in Lloyd cannot
be squared with the reasoning of the Court's opinion in Logan Valley
14. Id. at 393 (quoting Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1925)); see also
United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984) (jury acquitting defendant of possess-
ing two kilograms of cocaine, but finding him guilty of using the telephone to
possess the same two kilograms of cocaine).
15. For an excellent article on inconsistent verdicts, see Eric L. Muller, The Hobgob-
lin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 HARv. L. REV.
771 (1998).
16. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
17. Id. at 318.
18. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
19. Id. at 561-67.
20. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
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.... [W]e make clear now, if it was not clear before, that the rationale
of Logan Valley did not survive the Court's decision in the Lloyd
case."
2 1
Again, in an idealized world such inconsistencies could be avoided.
If the Court was candid about what it was doing, it would dispense
with inconsistent prior decisions by overruling them explicitly. Unfor-
tunately, even in an idealized world populated by perfectly rational
people not all causes of irrational decision-making can be avoided.
The basic nature of group decision-making inevitably creates the pos-
sibility of certain kinds of irrationality.22
The particular situation where a set of group-made decisions would
be deemed irrational had they been made by the same individual is
known as "collective irrationality."23 This can happen even though
each individual participant behaves rationally. To understand how
"collective irrationality" infects the Supreme Court, it is necessary to
remember that when the Court hands down an opinion, that opinion
reflects the results of two different votes. The first is the judgment,
that is, which party prevails. This vote takes place at the weekly con-
ference of the Justices, with each Justice voting for a particular judg-
ment, after a (usually brief) discussion of the merits of the case.24
The second vote is on the opinion explaining the reasoning that
supports the judgment. The reasoning consists of the resolution of the
relevant issues raised by each party in their arguments. The vote by
the Court on the opinion is not a formal vote; rather, it occurs after an
opinion is drafted and circulated among the Justices. 25 Each Justice
decides individually whether to join that opinion, join only in the judg-
ment and file a concurring opinion, or dissent from the judgment.26 If
a majority of the voting Justices join an opinion, it becomes the opin-
ion of the Supreme Court.
Because there are generally only two choices for a judgment-
plaintiff wins or defendant wins-the vote as to the appropriate judg-
21. Id. at 518.
22. The field of"social choice" explores the ways in which group decision-making can
lead to a set of results which would be irrational were they made by a single
individual. See, e.g., David Luban, Social Choice Theory as Jurisprudence, 69 S.
CAL. L. REV. 521, 521 (1996) ("Social choice theory studies the most basic ques-
tion of democratic politics and welfare economics: How should the preferences of
many individuals be amalgamated into a single social choice?"). See generally
Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes: The Political
Economy of Bush v. Gore, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1849, 1906-09 (2001).
23. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VAUEs 3 n.4 (1951).
24. See, e.g., DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER 293-96 (3d ed. 1993).
25. See, e.g., id. at 314-28.
26. See, e.g., id. at 335-46. There are numerous permutations as well. A Justice can
sign a majority opinion and file a concurring opinion. That will not detract from
the main opinion reflecting the majority's choice. Alternatively, a Justice could
sign onto part of a majority opinion and dissent from the rest.
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ment in the case almost always results in a majority decision. 27 Con-
versely, it is common for there to be multiple issues decided in any
given case. Thus, there are multiple opportunities for disagreement
among the Justices as to the appropriate rationale for reaching a par-
ticular judgment. It is this fact which creates the possibility of irra-
tional decision-making.
The task of creating a system for selecting among multiple options
presents an intractable problem for any group, including the Supreme
Court. If there are only two options for a group decision, a majority
vote can readily select between the alternatives. In the case of an odd
number of voters, as with nine Justices, one of the two options must
receive more votes than the other, and that choice can rightfully be
deemed the decision of the group. If there are three alternatives, how-
ever, there is no guarantee that one option will receive a majority of
the votes cast. For centuries, theorists have tried, without success, to
figure out the best way to treat a group decision where the votes are
divided in such a way that no single choice captures more than half of
the vote.
One such theorist, Nobel Prize winning economist Kenneth S. Ar-
row, has proven that no reasonable group-voting system for resolving
multiple issues can avoid all inconsistency. Specifically, Arrow
showed that under certain conditions, there always exists the poten-
tial for what is known as a "lack of transitivity." Transitivity requires
that preferences between several options be consistent, so that if one
prefers coffee to soda, and soda to tea, that person also prefers coffee
to tea. Given a choice of all three beverages, that person would choose
to drink coffee. Arrow's Theorem establishes that such a conclusion
does not necessarily follow in the context of group decision-making.
That is, given a similar choice of the three beverages, the group might
prefer coffee to soda, and soda to tea, but also prefer tea to coffee.
While the scholarly discussion of Arrow's Theorem is voluminous, 28
27. There are actually more than two "results"-affirm; reverse and remand; and re-
verse and dismiss. In practical terms, though, the Court is usually faced with the
choice of affirm or reverse. In each of those rare cases where there are three
options and no majority in favor of any disposition, a Justice changed his vote to
create a majority. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 134 (1945) (Rut-
ledge, J., concurring) (stating he would have preferred to affirm the judgment of
the lower court, but was voting to create a majority in favor of "reverse and re-
mand," rather than outright reversal).
28. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 38-42
(1991); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 82-86 (1989); WILLIAM H. RIKER,
LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DE-
MOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 18 (1982); Lynn A. Baker, Direct
Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 707 (1991); Cheryl D. Block, Truth and Probability-Ironies in the Evolu-
tion of Social Choice Theory, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 975, 975-81 (1998); Frank H. Eas-
terbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REV. 802, 813-14 (1982); Saul
900 [Vol. 84:895
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until now, no one has identified a lack of transitivity in Supreme
Court opinions. This Article presents the first such example, but it
also explains why Arrow's Theorem is not a significant cause of "irra-
tional" Supreme Court opinions.
However, a second form of irrational group decision-making exists,
which has occurred far more frequently and has only recently begun to
receive significant scholarly attention.2 9 It occurs when one party in a
case receives the votes of a majority of the Justices of the Court on
every relevant issue yet loses the case anyway. In these cases: (i) the
Court agrees that if all of the relevant issues are decided in one party's
favor, that party will win; (ii) at least five of the nine Justices rule in
favor of that same party on all relevant issues; but, (iii) the other
party wins.30 This phenomenon can be explained using what this Au-
thor has termed the "Irrationality Theorem." Stated generally, the Ir-
Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox,
75 VA. L. REV. 971, 987-88 (1989); William T. Mayton, The Possibilities of Collec-
tive Choice: Arrow's Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to
Administrative Agencies, 1986 DUKE L.J. 948, 950-52 (1986); Richard H. Pildes &
Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory,
Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2131-62
(1990); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent
as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 249 (1992); Maxwell L. Steams,
Standing Back From the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV.
1309, 1329-50 (1995).
29. See, e.g., MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESs: A SOcIAL CHOICE ANAL-
YSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 111-24 (2000) [hereinafter STEARNS,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS]; Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 22, at 1849; Evan
H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior
Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1994); Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter
of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 123 (1999); Lewis A.
Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Colle-
gial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Kornhauser & Sager, The One
and the Many]; Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court,
96 YALE L.J. 82 (1986) [hereinafter Komhauser & Sager, Unpacking the Court];
Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for Multi-
member Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75 (2003); David G. Post & Steven C. Salop,
Issues and Outcomes, Guidance, and Indeterminacy: A Reply to Professor John
Rogers and Others, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1069 (1996); David G. Post & Steven C.
Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels,
80 GEo. L.J. 743 (1992) [hereinafter Post & Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewa-
ter]; John M. Rogers, "Issue Voting" by Multimember Appellate Courts: A Re-
sponse to Some Radical Proposals, 49 VAND. L. REV. 997 (1996) [hereinafter
Rogers, Issue Voting]; John M. Rogers, "I Vote This Way Because I'm Wrong": The
Supreme Court Justice as Epimenides, 79 Ky. L.J. 439 (1991) [hereinafter Rogers,
I Vote This Way]; Maxwell L. Stearns, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes?: Miller
v. Albright in Social Choice Perspective, 7 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 87, 127-28 (1999)
[hereinafter Stearns, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes]; Maxwell L. Stearns,
How Outcome Voting Promotes Principled Issue Identification: A Reply to Profes-
sor John Rogers and Others, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1045 (1996).
30. This sort of irrationality has been variously termed a "doctrinal paradox," see,
e.g., Kornhauser & Sager, The One and the Many, supra note 29, at 10-18, and a
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rationality Theorem proves that there is no way to eliminate the
possibility that a majority of the Supreme Court (or any other multi-
member tribunal) will vote that one party should lose on every rele-
vant issue in a case yet win the case anyway. Several cases embody-
ing this irrationality are discussed in detail below.
II. A [blunt?] ARROW AIMED AT THE HEART OF
THE SUPREME COURT
When a group votes on more than two items, there is no guarantee
that a majority will favor one position. Even more troublesome, the
option that gets the most votes might actually be the one most
strongly opposed by a majority. For example, an extremist candidate
with forty percent of the vote might defeat two moderate candidates
who split the remaining vote, even though sixty percent of the electo-
rate would prefer either of the two losing candidates.
One solution to the effects of such elections was proposed by the
eighteenth-century French mathematician Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nico-
las Caritat de Condorcet. Condorcet, who was a friend of both Thomas
Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin, dreamed of inventing a concept of
"social mathematics" that would enable government and society to be
ruled by reason. 3 1 In essence, Condorcet's proposal was to divide a
vote on multiple options into a series of two-way, head-to-head battles.
The "winner" is the alternative which obtains a simple majority over
every other alternative in two-way competition, and is known gener-
ally as the "Condorcet winner."32 To say that Condorcet's mathemati-
cal writing was not initially well-received is a considerable
understatement:
The obscurity and self-contradiction are without any parallel, so far as our
experience of mathematical works extend... no amount of examples can con-
vey an adequate impression of the evils. We believe that the work has been
very little studied, for we have not observed any recognition of the repulsive
peculiarities by which it is so undesirably distinguished. 3 3
Ultimately, however, Condorcet's approach became accepted as one of
the more plausible attempts to deal with elections involving multiple
choices.
"voting anomaly," see, e.g., Stearns, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes, supra
note 29, at 90.
31. See, e.g., EDWARD KASNER & JAMES NEWMAN, MATHEMATICS AND THE IMAGINATION
254 (1940).
32. See, e.g., H.P. Young, Condorcet's Theory of Voting, 82 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 1231
(1986).
33. KEITH MICHAEL BAKER, CONDORCET: FROM NATURAL PHILOSOPHY TO SOCIAL
MATHEMATICS 227 (1975) (quoting ISAAC TODHUNTER, HISTORY OF THE MATHEMAT-
ICAL THEORY OF PROBABILITY 352 (1865)).
[Vol. 84:895
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The following example demonstrates how Condorcet's approach
works. Consider the case in which nine voters list their preference
between three candidates (A, B, and C) in the following way:
2 voters 3 voters 4 voters
FIRST A B C
PREFERENCE SECOND B A B
ORDER
I THIRD C C A
Since no candidate receives a majority of the first-place votes, the Con-
dorcet plan calls for a series of head-to-head matches. Among all the
voters, Candidate B is preferred over Candidate A, by seven votes
(4+3) to two. Candidate B is also preferred over Candidate C by five
votes (3+2) to four. Thus, Candidate B, having won all the head-to-
head matches, would be declared the Condorcet winner.
Unfortunately, the Condorcet strategy of head-to-head competition
is not without its problems. The most serious weakness is that it fre-
quently will not produce a winner, as in this next example. Assume
Alice, Bob, and Charles, are trying to select which flavor of ice cream
to serve at their party. Their preferences are ranked in the following
order:
Alice Bob Charles
FIRST Vanilla Chocolate Strawberry
PREFERENCE SECOND Strawberry Vanilla Chocolate
ORDER
I THIRD Chocolate Strawberry Vanilla
Each of the three flavors receives one first place vote, so there is no
simple majority winner. Unfortunately, the Condorcet approach also
fails to produce a winner. In a head-to-head contest, Chocolate beats
Vanilla two to one. In a similar match-up, Vanilla beats Strawberry
two to one. Finally, because Strawberry defeats Chocolate two to one,
no choice prevails in all the head-to-head matches. The following
chart shows the lack of transitivity:
Contest Winner
Chocolate vs. Vanilla Chocolate
Vanilla vs. Strawberry Vanilla
Strawberry vs. Chocolate Strawberry
2006]
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This is an example of "collective irrationality." If one announces a
preference for Chocolate over Vanilla, and for Vanilla over Straw-
berry, it is irrational for that person to then say he or she also prefers
Strawberry to Chocolate (If 3 is greater than 2, and 2 is greater than
1, we naturally expect 3 to be greater than 1 also). This failure of logic
resulting from application of Condorcet's method is also known as "cy-
cling" because every winner also loses.34
This lack of transitivity creates a potential danger for democracy
because the person who sets the voting agenda can control the out-
come.3 5 If the person setting the voting sequence favors Chocolate (in
the ice cream example), she could stage the first head-to-head match
between Vanilla and Strawberry, with Vanilla prevailing, and the sec-
ond between Vanilla and Chocolate, whereby Chocolate wins (Agenda
I). A leader with a preference for Strawberry, however, might start
with Vanilla versus Chocolate, in which Chocolate wins, and follow
with Strawberry versus Chocolate, with Strawberry prevailing
(Agenda II). Thus, the election result may not turn on the will of the
group so much as manipulation by those who control the agenda.
Agenda I
Contest Winner
ROUND 1 Vanilla vs. Strawberry Vanilla
ROUND 2 Vanilla vs. Chocolate Chocolate
Agenda II
Contest Winner
ROUND 1 Chocolate vs. Vanilla Chocolate
ROUND 2 Strawberry vs. Chocolate Strawberry
The presence of cycling in Condorcet's system was hailed an incur-
able defect by the prominent writer, Reverend Charles L. Dodgson,
who also wrote under the name Lewis Carroll. Dodgson mocked sup-
porters of Condorcet for their willingness to dispose of the problem of
cycling as an extreme and improbable outcome:
34. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 28, at 985.
35. See Block, supra note 28, at 987 ("[T]hose with control over the agenda or proce-
dures are in a position to intentionally manipulate results."). In fact, even if
those in charge desire to be neutral, their agenda-setting choice will still deter-
mine the election. See Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence
and its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 561, 589 (1977) (stating that the agenda can
control the outcome of the voting, even if"adopted with the most outcome-neutral
intentions").
[Vol. 84:895
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I am quite prepared to be told.. . "Oh, that is an extreme case: it could never
really happen!" Now I have observed that this answer is always given in-
stantly, with perfect confidence, and without any examination of the proposed
case. It must therefore rest on some general principle: the mental process
being probably something like this -I have formed a theory. This case con-
tradicts my theory. Therefore this is an extreme case, and would never occur
in practice." 3 6
More recently, economist Kenneth Arrow demonstrated that far
from being an unusual result, the possibility for group irrationality
exists in every possible voting scheme designed to enable a group deci-
sion from among more than two candidates.37 Arrow's "General Possi-
bility Theorem," which is more commonly called his "Impossibility
Theorem," states that no possible voting system can both prevent cy-
cling and yet meet the following four goals:
(i) Unanimity: If everyone in the group prefers A to B, the group
prefers A to B.
(ii) Nondictatorship: No one member has the power to determine
the outcome regardless of the preferences of the other group members.
(iii) Range ("citizens' sovereignty"): When comparing alternatives,
individual members are free to establish their preferences in any
order.
(iv) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: If an individual or
group has a preference between two options, the preference between
those two is not affected by consideration of other options.
Arrow's Theorem has been summarized as follows: "No voting rule
which allows voters to express their true preference and which treats
each preference as equally decisive can assure us that it will produce a
single preferred choice for three or more voters who have at least
three alternatives."38 The implications of this theorem are considera-
ble. As economist Paul Samuelson wrote in 1952, "The search of the
great minds of recorded history for the perfect democracy, it turns out,
is the search for a chimera, for a logical self-contradiction." 3 9
Because Arrow's Theorem applies to any group's attempt to reach
an aggregate decision, the theorem can also be applied to the Supreme
Court.40 Judge (then-Professor) Easterbrook wrote that Arrow's The-
orem proved that the Court's decisions would tend to become inconsis-
36. C.L. DODGSON, A METHOD OF TAKING VOTES ON MORE THAN Two ISSUES (1876),
reprinted in DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS 224,
263 (2d ed. 1998). In fact, the likelihood of cycling increases with an increase in
the number of different options from which to choose. See STEVEN J. BRAMS,
PARADOXES IN POLITICS 41-43 (1976) (stating that as the number of candidates
increase towards infinity, the probability of cycling occurring among three voters
increases to one hundred percent).
37. ARROW, supra note 23, at 42-59.
38. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 12-13 (1997).
39. PAUL HOFFMAN, ARCHIMEDES' REVENGE 221 (1988).
40. Easterbrook, supra note 28, at 802.
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tent with one another: "At least some inconsistency, and probably a
great deal of inconsistency, is inevitable."41 While Arrow's Theorem
has much to say about group decisions, which includes those of the
Supreme Court, one must be careful in drawing practical conclusions
of "inevitability" from principles of axiomatic logic.
First, it is not necessary for members of the Court to decide on a
sequential rank of preferences before reaching a decision. All a Jus-
tice need do is decide his or her favored option for all the issues. If
there is no majority support for a particular set of conclusions, the
Justices then decide whether they would rather join their colleagues
in a majority-creating position or else maintain their first preference
irrespective of the failure to reach a majority. The first scenario might
occur when a Justice prefers settling an issue and creating (somewhat
desirable) precedent to holding out for his or her most desired posi-
tion.42 Significantly, such circumstances do not require that any Jus-
tice make a complete ranking of all voting permutations.
Moreover, should a Justice decide to rank his or her preferences in
order, it would likely remain undisclosed. While Justices often discuss
their position on various issues in the same case, research of relevant
Supreme Court case law reveals no case in which all of the Justices
have detailed a preference order for every permutation of issues in-
volved.4 3 Without each member's complete ranking, it is not possible
to determine the aggregate preference order for the Court.
Even if a complete preference ranking of all the Justices were
available, the nature of Supreme Court voting minimizes the signifi-
cance of a lack of transitivity. To see why, consider a variation of the
41. Id. at 831.
42. Consider Justice Scalia's opinion in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). In Cruzan, the Court, by a five to four vote, ruled
that the State of Missouri did not violate the Due Process Clause by requiring
parents of a comatose daughter to prove "by clear and convincing evidence" that
she would have wanted the termination of life support. The Court stated that the
state's great interest in the "protection and preservation of human life" out-
weighed the "constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment." Id. at 278, 280. Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion,
but wrote a concurring opinion indicating that he preferred a different rationale:
While I agree with the Court's analysis today, and therefore join in its
opinion, I would have preferred that we announce, clearly and promptly,
that the federal courts have no business in this field; that American law
has always accorded the State the power to prevent, by force if neces-
sary, suicide-including suicide by refusing to take appropriate mea-
sures necessary to preserve one's life ....
Id. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring).
43. Specifically, in none of the cases discussed in this Article do the Justices describe
their preference order for all permutations of the issues in a case. Since the cases
collected in this Article are the most fractured of the multi-issue cases, and be-
cause there is no obvious reason for a Justice to go through such a process, it
seems highly unlikely that such a listing has occurred in any case.
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Pentagon Papers case, where President Nixon acted on his own au-
thority to enjoin a newspaper from publishing information on the
grounds of national security.4 4 Assume that, as in the real case, there
are two issues: (i) whether the President's unilateral action violates
separation of powers doctrine; and (ii) whether enjoining the newspa-
per violates the First Amendment. If the newspaper prevails on either
or both of these issues, the injunction will be lifted.
Assume that, unlike the real case, all of the Justices want the in-
junction lifted.45 Thus, the choice of "no violation of either separation
of powers or First Amendment" is everyone's least preferred option.
Next, assume that a group composed of Justices Marshall, White, and
Stewart is so anxious to show its disapproval of the President, that
their strongest preference is to have the injunction lifted on both sepa-
ration of powers and First Amendment grounds. 4 6 Their next prefer-
ence is to lift the injunction on separation of powers grounds alone,
and their third preference is to rely only on the First Amendment.
Further imagine that Justices Douglas, Black and Brennan are
strong supporters of First Amendment rights, and their strongest
preference is to have the injunction lifted on First Amendment
grounds alone. Their next preference is to rely on both the First
Amendment and separation of powers.4 7 Thus, their third preference
is to rely only on separation of powers.
Finally, imagine that Justices Harlan, Burger, and Blackmun are
most concerned with separation of powers but believe that finding
both a separation of powers and First Amendment violation would be
unnecessarily insulting to the President. Thus, their first preference
is to have the injunction lifted on separation of powers grounds alone,
44. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
45. In the real case, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan and Blackmun voted
to uphold the injunction. See id. at 756 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating the Presi-
dent had "constitutional primacy in the field of foreign affairs"). Both Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justice Blackmun signed Justice Harlan's dissent.
46. In the real case, Justices Marshall, White, and Stewart focused on the separation
of powers. See id. at 741 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("The issue is whether this
Court or the Congress has the power to make law."); id. at 732 (White, J., concur-
ring) ('At least in the absence of legislation by Congress, based on its own investi-
gations and findings, I am quite unable to agree that the inherent powers of the
Executive and the courts reach so far as to authorize remedies having such
sweeping potential for inhibiting publications by the press."). Justice Stewart
joined Justice White's concurrence.
47. In the real case, Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Black focused exclusively on the
First Amendment and did not discuss the separation of powers. See id. at 725
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Tihe First Amendment stands as an absolute bar to
the imposition of judicial restraints in circumstances of the kind presented by
these cases."); id. at 714-15 (Black, J., concurring) ("I believe that every mo-
ment's continuance of the injunctions against these newspapers amounts to a fla-
grant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First Amendment."). Justice
Douglas joined Justice Black's concurrence.
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their second preference is to have the injunction lifted on First
Amendment grounds alone, and their third preference is to rely on
both. The Justices' preference order would then appear as follows:
Marshall, White, Douglas, Black, Harlan, Burger,
Stewart Brennan Blackmun
[3 votes] [3 votes] [3 votes]
1 Violates Both Only Violates Only Violates
1st Amendment Sep of Powers
PREFERENCE 2 Only Violates Violates Both Only Violates
ORDER Sep of Powers 1st Amendment
3 Only Violates 1st Only Violates Violates Both
Amendment Sep of Powers
4 Not Violate Ei- Not Violate Ei- Not Violate Ei-
ther ther ther
Just as occurred in the previous ice cream example, head-to-head vot-
ing results in an unbreakable cycle among the top three choices: "Vio-
lates Both" defeats "Only Violates Sep of Powers" by a six-to-three
vote (with the Marshall and Douglas groups prevailing); "Only Vio-
lates Sep of Powers" defeats "Only Violates 1st Amendment" by a six
to three vote (with the Marshall and Harlan groups prevailing); and
"Only Violates 1st Amendment" defeats "Violates Both" by a six to
three vote (with the Douglas and Harlan groups prevailing). Thus,
there is no Condorcet winner and no transitivity.
In all likelihood, however, the Court's decision would not reveal the
order of preferences so that not even the Justices would know that
cycling occurred. In fact, the Court might issue a unanimous judg-
ment supporting the newspaper with three separate opinions expres-
sing a different set of issue resolutions. Alternatively, however, the
Court could end with an opinion containing "shifting majorities," and
holding that the President violated both the separation of powers and
the First Amendment. 48 Justice Marshall might write an opinion
which he and his two supporters embrace completely. The other
groups would likely sign onto only the part they agree with, creating
majority support for the issues they favor. Thus, each group obtains
what it wants most: Douglas's group gets a First Amendment decision,
Harlan's group gets a separation of powers decision, and Marshall's
group gets both.49 Thus, the lack of transitivity does not prevent the
48. See Rogers, I Vote This Way, supra note 29, at 456.
49. Note that the exact same result could follow even if the preference order did not
result in cycling. Consider the same voting breakdown, only this time assume
that the Harlan group was so concerned with separation of powers that its
strongest preference was to have the injunction lifted on separation of powers
grounds alone, with its next preference being relying on both.
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Court from resolving the dispute before it. Moreover, the process of
Supreme Court voting is capable of masking the existence of such cy-
cling when it does occur.
One might also inquire whether the conditions necessary for Ar-
row's Theorem to operate are ever met in the case of Supreme Court
decision-making. Professor Maxwell Stearns argues convincingly that
Arrow's requirement of unlimited "range" is not present in Supreme
Court voting. 50 Stearns claims two aspects of Supreme Court deci-
sion-making prevent the Justices from "ranking the underlying ratio-
nales offered in the various opinions in a given case in any conceivable
order."51 First, every case is decided by outcome voting, the dichoto-
mous choice of which party wins.5 2 Second, majority opinions are
often able to be created only by deferring to the Justice who holds the
narrowest grounds for supporting the winning side. 53 These two fac-
The Justices' revised preference order would then appear as follows:
Marshall, White, Douglas, Black, Harlan, Burger,
Stewart Brennan Blackmun
[3 votes] [3 votes] [3 votes]
1 Violates Both Only Violates Only Violates
1st Amendment Sep of Powers
PREFERENCE 2 Only Violates Violates Both Violates Both
ORDER Sep of Powers
3 Only Violates 1st Only Violates Only Violates
Amendment Sep of Powers 1st Amendment
4 Not Violate Ei- Not Violate Ei- Not Violate Ei-
ther ther ther
This time there is no cycling. "Violates Both" prevails over the other three
choices in head-to-head competitions, defeating "Only Violates Sep of Power" six
to three (Marshall and Douglas prevailing); defeating "Only Violates 1st Amend-
ment" six to three (Marshall and Harlan prevailing); and defeating "Not Violate
Either" nine to zero. Thus, "Violates Both" is the Condorcet winner and there is
no lack of transitivity.
The Court's decision again might be contained in three separate opinions, all
supporting the newspaper and each expressing a different set of issue resolu-
tions. The Court might, however, end up again with an opinion with "shifting
majorities," holding that the President violated both the separation of powers and
the First Amendment.
Thus, whether or not head-to-head voting results in cycling, the process of
Supreme Court voting can lead to the identical finished product.
50. Stearns, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes, supra note 29, at 109.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. See id. One such example might be Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), where
four Justices went along with Justice Kennedy's opinion that prayer at a high
school graduation was an unconstitutional "coercion" of religion by the govern-
ment, even though the four apparently saw the case as more of an "endorsement"
of religion which violated the First Amendment. Id. at 609 (Blackmun, J., con-
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tors reduce the sovereignty of the Justices because they "significantly
limit strategic interactions among the justices . . . ."54 Thus, the con-
dition of "range" may not apply to the Supreme Court.
Even if one concludes that all four of Arrow's conditions apply to
the Supreme Court, the question remains as to what conclusions can
be drawn about the Court's decision-making. According to Easter-
brook, "as time goes on and the stock of precedents grows . .. [the
availability of inconsistent precedents allows the Justices to 'prove'
anything they like, without fear of contradiction." 55 However, if pre-
cedent is viewed narrowly, Arrow's Theorem does not create a serious
problem of inconsistent Supreme Court constitutional decisions be-
cause a Court faced with a narrowly-defined precedent it dislikes is
free to vote to overturn it.56 Since each vote on overruling is dichoto-
mous, there is no danger of cycling. Thus, while the Court will, at
different times, be inconsistent in its decisions, it will not face a stable
of inconsistent precedents.
The same does not hold, however, if precedent is considered more
broadly. When precedent concerning a particular constitutional deci-
sion is not based solely on whether a particular clause is violated, but
also includes the values or principles accompanying that decision, Ar-
row's Theorem may create a problem. 5 7 There are numerous prece-
dential values or principles contained in Court decisions. In weighing
the importance of these values or principles, each of the nine Justices
would likely establish a different preference order. According to Ar-
row's Theorem, an attempt to aggregate individual preferences into a
complete order of preference could lead to cycling problems.
Consider three values (A, B, and C)58 preferred by nine Justices in
the following order:
curring) ("[Olur cases have prohibited government endorsement of religion, its
sponsorship, and active involvement in religion, whether or not citizens were co-
erced to conform."). Justice Kennedy had previously refused to find mere "en-
dorsement" as unconstitutional. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("This view of the Establishment Clause re-
flects an unjustified hostility toward religion, a hostility inconsistent with our
history and our precedents...."). Accordingly, the four joined Justice Kennedy's
"coercion" analysis in Lee to constitute a winning majority opinion.
54. Stearns, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes, supra note 29, at 109.
55. Easterbrook, supra note 28, at 831.
56. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985) (holding
Congress can enforce minimum-wage laws against the states).
57. Easterbrook, supra note 28, at 830.
58. For example, the principles could be federalism, separation of powers, and stare
decisis.
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Justices 1,2,3 Justices 4,5,6 Justices 7,8,9
FIRST Value A Value B Value C
PREFERENCE SECOND Value B Value C Value A
ORDER
,THIRD Value C Value A I Value B
The value preferences are, once again, not transitive. In this example,
Arrow's inconsistency might manifest itself in two ways. If all three
values are implicated by the same case, the Court might be unable to
reach a majority opinion. Each group of Justices will join one of three
opinions arguing that a different value should determine the case.
The judgment of the split Court will depend on which party is favored
by at least two of the competing values. This does not pose a problem
of collective irrationality; it is merely an example of collective disa-
greement. Indeed, if the values supporting the prevailing judgment
are not mutually exclusive, it is likely that a majority opinion will be
written incorporating the multiple values supporting it.59
A more troubling type of inconsistency arises when only two values
are considered at a time. For example, in the first case a majority of
the Court might determine that Value A is more important than Value
B. In a subsequent case, a majority of the Court might rationally con-
clude that Value B is more important than Value C. Finally, in a later
case a majority of rational Justices, might conclude that Value C is
more important than Value A. Thus, those trying to reconcile the
Court's precedent would correctly perceive that a Court consisting of
perfectly logical individuals has created an irrational, precedential
preference order. Using Arrow's Theorem to explain actual Supreme
Court decisions requires great caution, however. Almost all of the in-
consistency found in Supreme Court decisions can be attributed to fac-
tors other than the inevitability of cycling.
First, Arrow's Theorem only speaks to cycling among the same
group of voters. Arrow's work was motivated by, and limited to, an
exploration of the "methods of aggregating individual tastes which im-
ply rational behavior on the part of the community ... ."60 For the
Supreme Court, the community consists of nine Justices hearing a
particular case at a particular time. It does not take a mathematical
proof to establish that different communities can reach decisions that
59. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). In holding unconstitu-
tional a federal law which required state law enforcement officers to conduct
background checks on prospective handgun purchasers, the majority opinion
cited two values: federalism, id. at 920 ('The Constitution thus contemplates that
a State's government will represent and remain accountable to its own citizens."),
and separation of powers, id. at 922 ("The Constitution does not leave to specula-
tion who is to administer the laws enacted by Congress; the President ... .
60. ARRow, supra note 23, at 3.
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are inconsistent or that rely on inconsistent values and principles.
That is, as membership on the Court changes over time, decisions on
particular issues are also likely to change, creating inconsistency with
prior decisions. This result can occur even though both Courts act ra-
tionally in their decision-making.
United States v. Morrison6 1 offers a prime example. In that case,
the Supreme Court ruled in a five to four decision that a provision of
the Violence Against Women Act providing a federal civil remedy to
victims of gender-motivated violence exceeded Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause. 62 The Court held that Congress may not "regu-
late noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that con-
duct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce." 63 Chief Justice
Rehnquist added: "In recognizing this fact we preserve one of the few
principles that has been consistent since the Clause was adopted."64
Alternatively, Justice Souter's dissenting opinion provided: "Our cases
... stand for the following proposition[ ]. Congress has the power to
legislate with regard to activity that, in the aggregate, has a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce." 6 5
Assuming Chief Justice Rehnquist is correct, earlier cases uphold-
ing federal laws that protect civil rights and outlaw loan sharking are
not inconsistent with Morrison; they simply presented an issue differ-
ent from a law banning violent, non-economic conduct.66 If Justice
Souter is correct, the inconsistency between Morrison and earlier
cases is still not caused by a lack of transitivity. Rather, in the year
2000, a majority acted according to a different set of values (preserv-
ing a sphere of regulation for the states) than those of earlier Courts
(deferring to Congress's view of the national economic welfare). Simi-
larly, the inconsistency between the Court of the 1960s and the
1990s 6 7 can more readily be attributed to a change in values among
the voting Justices, rather than to the inevitable cycling of values.
A second caution regarding the use of Arrow's Theorem to explain
Supreme Court decision-making arises in the case of plurality opin-
61. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
62. Id. at 617.
63. Id. The Court struck down 42 U.S.C. § 13981, a part of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994.
64. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.
65. Id. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting).
66. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding anti-loan sharking
law); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (uphold-
ing Civil Rights Act).
67. Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (stating that "any inciden-
tal burden on the free exercise of... religion [must] be justified by a 'compelling
state interest ... "'), with Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990)
(stating that if a burden on the free exercise of religion is "merely the incidental
effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amend-
ment has not been offended").
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ions. Because the Supreme Court does not vote by ranking individual
preferences, plurality opinions are generally not caused by cycling.
Take the case of Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,68 holding that a law
banning public nudity and applied to nude dancing, did not violate the
First Amendment. 6 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for three Jus-
tices, found that the statute was justified by the state's interest in pro-
tecting societal order and morality.70 Justice Scalia determined that
because the statute was a law of general applicability, it could not vio-
late the First Amendment. 71 Justice Souter found that the law as ap-
plied did not violate the First Amendment because of the state's
interest in combating the "secondary effects of adult establish-
ments."72
Attempting to ascertain the meaning of Barnes, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals erroneously blamed the confusion on Arrow's
Theorem:
In any case in which the Court does not produce a majority opinion, and there
are several different issues on which the members of the Court disagree, it
may follow that no single line of reasoning can be described that is both inter-
nally consistent and is subscribed to by a majority with respect to each pre-
mise and conclusion.
7 3
In fact, the problem in Barnes is not explained by Arrow's Theorem.
Since the Supreme Court does not engage in head-to-head voting be-
tween pairs of issues, there is no lack of transitivity in this case. As
with most cases involving plurality decisions, it is simply the result of
Justices faced with more than two options and dividing such that
there is no majority. Thus, no internal inconsistency results by alter-
ing the order in which the Court voted.
A final and especially serious limitation on the applicability of Ar-
row's Theorem to Supreme Court decision-making is that, for cycling
to cause the Court to create conflicting precedents, the conflicting val-
ues cannot all be raised initially in the same case. If forced to confront
a conflicting preference order of principles at the same time, the lack
of transitivity would create a split Court, unable to reach any majority
opinion, and thus unable to create any precedent at all. Accordingly,
the lack of transitivity will create a pool of inconsistent precedents
only where different pairs of principles arise in separate cases raising
unrelated issues. The lack of transitivity would then only cause a
problem if those principles subsequently arise together in a case
where somehow they are all relevant to deciding the same issue.
68. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
69. Id. (plurality opinion).
70. Id. at 568.
71. Id. at 572 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
72. Id. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
73. DLS, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 107 F.3d 403, 409 n.4 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing
KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963)).
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A rare example of a lack of transitivity can be seen in a trio of cases
involving the following question: When multiple issues are presented
to the Court, in what order should those issues be addressed? In a
1974 case, National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of
Railroad Passengers,74 the Supreme Court was faced with a challenge
to discontinued train service by a group of passengers. There were
two primary issues: (i) whether the Amtrak Act created a private
cause of action; and (ii) whether the plaintiffs had standing under the
Act. The Court stated that the first issue to be addressed was
whether there was a private cause of action because, "[s]ince we hold
that no right of action exists, questions of standing and jurisdiction
become immaterial."75
In the 1984 case, Block v. Community Nutrition Institute,76 con-
sumers challenged a milk market order of the Secretary of Agricul-
ture. The court of appeals found that the consumers had
constitutional standing but lacked standing under the relevant stat-
ute. The Supreme Court addressed the statutory standing issue first,
and, finding that Congress did not intend to grant standing to con-
sumers, declared there was no reason to decide the constitutional
standing issue. 77
Finally, in 1998 the Court decided Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment,7 8 an environmental case presenting two issues: (i)
whether the relevant law created a private cause of action for "purely
past violations"; and (ii) whether the plaintiffs had constitutional
standing. The Court ruled that constitutional standing must be de-
cided first, because, "Article III jurisdiction is always an antecedent
question . . ."79
We are thus left with a true lack of transitivity.8 0 When the issues
were "private cause of action" and "statutory standing," cause of action
was decided first. When the issues were "statutory standing" and
"constitutional standing," statutory standing was decided first. When
the issues were "constitutional standing" and "cause of action," how-
ever, constitutional standing was decided first. The following chart
shows these cases exhibit the same cycling that occurred in the ice
cream scenario:
74. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
75. Id. at 456 n.13.
76. 467 U.S. 340 (1984).
77. Id. at 353 n.4.
78. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
79. Id. at 101.
80. Justice Stevens referred to this result as "a logical dilemma." Id. at 120 n. 12 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, for the Court, referred to the lack of transi-
tivity as a "broken circle[ ]." Id. at 97 n.2 (majority opinion).
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Choice of Issues Which Is Decided First?
Cause of Action vs. Statutory Cause of Action
Standing
Statutory Standing vs. Statutory Standing
Constitutional Standing
Cause of Action vs. Constitutional Standing
Constitutional Standing
The failure of logic in this result would become readily apparent were
all three issues subsequently raised in a single case. Based on prece-
dent, the Court has no way to decide which of the three issues to begin
with, since, for any issue chosen, there is another which is antecedent.
That a true example of cycling has been identified does not mean
that it is a common occurrence. In fact, this lack of transitivity arises
only in the rare situation where three related issues appear in sepa-
rate pairings in different cases. Further, for lack of transitivity to be a
problem, the three issues must finally arise in the same case. That is,
if only two of these issues recur, the Court will simply reach the same
conclusion it did the first time that pairing occurred.8 1 Only if the
Court is required to resolve the three issues in the same case will the
Court have to contend with lack of transitivity. Since the above trio of
cases were decided, however, no Supreme Court case has presented all
three issues simultaneously. Arrow's Theorem stays in its quiver.
Significantly, however, the nature of Supreme Court decision-mak-
ing creates an alternative type of irrationality, quite distinct from the
cycling described by Condorcet and Arrow. The following section dem-
onstrates that irrationality is possible in any case with at least two
distinct issues, and that such irrationality has occurred many times.
III. THE IRRATIONALITY THEOREM
Suppose one was to say, "I will take an umbrella either if it is rain-
ing now or if the forecast calls for rain. It is both raining and the
forecast says 'rain today.' Therefore, I won't take my umbrella." Such
a decision would be considered irrational, because every condition for
taking an umbrella was met yet the opposite conclusion was
reached.8 2 Assuming there is no other reason for not taking an um-
81. See Kornhauser & Sager, Unpacking the Court, supra note 29, at 108 n.35 ("[A]
perfectly stable voting pattern emerges from such a court. If the individual judges
decide cases consistently, like cases will be decided alike, and no problem of con-
sistency presents itself."); see also Rogers, I Vote This Way, supra note 29, at
468-69.
82. In terms of formal logic, the first sentence in the quote is a syllogism, consisting
of two alternate premises and a conclusion. The next sentence declares the two
2006] 915
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brella (e.g., someone else is bringing an umbrella to share), a rational
person should not reach this conclusion.
Groups like the Supreme Court, however, can and sometimes do
reach similar irrational conclusions. In several cases, one party has
garnered the support of a majority of the Justices on every relevant
issue, but still lost the case. This irrationality is not merely aestheti-
cally unpleasing, it makes it impossible for lower courts to apply Su-
preme Court precedent faithfully. It also creates the real possibility
that disputes raising similar issues will be resolved differently. A re-
cent case, Miller v. Albright,83 reveals both the structure of institu-
tional irrationality and the confusion which inevitably follows.
A. Miller and Sex Discrimination
The primary claim in Miller was that a provision of the federal Im-
migration and Naturalization Act84 amounted to unconstitutional sex
discrimination. When only one parent of an illegitimate child is an
American citizen, federal law creates different rules for obtaining citi-
zenship for that child, depending on the sex of the citizen parent.
Children born abroad and out of wedlock to citizen fathers, but not to
citizen mothers, must obtain formal proof of a biological connection
with the citizen parent by age eighteen. Lorelyn Penero Miller was
born outside the United States to a Filipino mother and an American
citizen father. She was denied an American passport and filed suit in
federal court.
There were three main issues in the case. The first question con-
cerned whether the federal courts had power to grant the relief
sought, a judgment declaring Miller a citizen of the United States.
Second, since she was not treated differently because of her own sex,
the Court had to determine whether Miller had standing to raise the
claim of gender discrimination on behalf of her father. The third ques-
tion was whether the law unconstitutionally discriminated on the ba-
sis of sex. For Miller to win the case, she needed to prevail on all three
issues.
A fractured Court issued four different opinions.8 5 Writing only for
himself and Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens ruled for the
premises to be true. The last sentence rejects the conclusion. Assuming there are
no unspoken premises, this would be an illogical conclusion.
83. 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2000).
85. There were actually five opinions, with all three dissenters, Justices Ginsburg,
Souter, and Breyer, signing onto two decisions, one authored by Justice Gins-
burg, the other by Justice Breyer. For purposes of the analysis of the Court's
irrationality in Miller, it is easier to consider just Justice Breyer's opinion, as
Justice Ginsburg's focused primarily on the history of discriminatory immigra-
tion laws and did not address the other two issues of the case. Miller, 523 U.S. at
460-71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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government. He stated that the Court had the power to declare Miller
a citizen, and that she had standing to raise the sex discrimination
issue. Nonetheless, he wrote that the law did not violate equal protec-
tion because it was based on real differences between male and female
parents in "ensuring reliable proof of a biological relationship," and
not on the "accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about
the members of either sex."86
Justice Scalia, writing for himself and Justice Thomas, did not ad-
dress whether the law violated the equal protection clause, but did
find that Miller had standing to raise the sex discrimination claim for
her father.87 Justice Scalia found for the government on the grounds
that the Court had no power to issue the requested remedy, "conferral
of citizenship on a basis other than that prescribed by Congress."88
Justice O'Connor, writing for herself and Justice Kennedy, also
ruled for the government. She wrote that in light of the "presumption
against third-party standing," Miller did not have standing to raise
the claim that her father received differential treatment due to his
sex.8 9 While not addressing the issue of whether the Court had the
power to issue the requested remedy, O'Connor stated that the law
could not pass the constitutional standard for sex discrimination: "Al-
though I do not share Justice [Stevens'] assessment that the provision
withstands heightened scrutiny, I believe it passes rational scrutiny
for the reasons he gives for sustaining it under the higher standard."90
Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Gins-
burg and Souter joined.9 1 He wrote that Miller should win the case.
First, because of her close relationship with her father, and because
the government had successfully convinced the district court to dis-
miss her father from suit, Miller had standing to raise his sex discrim-
ination claim.92 Second, the Court had power to grant the desired
remedy, since the statute would automatically confer citizenship with
the offending section removed. Finally, Breyer wrote that the law un-
constitutionally discriminated based on sex.
Thus, the Court ruled that one party-the government-should
win the case even though a majority of the Justices apparently be-
86. Id. at 444-45 (plurality opinion).
87. Id. at 455 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 453.
89. Id. at 445 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 451-52.
91. Justice Ginsburg also wrote a dissent in which Justices Breyer and Souter joined.
Because her opinion did not address all of the issues raised in the case, and be-
cause she joined in Justice Breyer's opinion, I will treat her opinions as reflected
in Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion.
92. Miller, 523 U.S. at 473-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The lower court had ruled
that the father lacked standing because he was not harmed by his daughter's lack
of citizenship.
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lieved that the winning party was wrong on every relevant constitu-
tional issue. By putting the votes of the different Justices in chart
form, one can see how this surprising result was reached.
Author of opin- Does Miller Does law's gen- Can Court Does Miller
ion and num- have standing der-based dis- award relief win?
ber of Justices to raise her fa- tinction violate without violat-
joining the ther's constitu- equal protec- ing separation
opinion tional claim? tion? of powers?
Stevens (2) Yes (2) No (2) Yes (2) No (2)
O'Connor (2) No (2) Yes (2) Not Say (2) No (2)
Scalia (2) Yes (2) Not Say (2) No (2) No (2)
Breyer (3) Yes (3) Yes (3) Yes (3) Yes (3)
TOTAL Yes 7-2 Yes 5-2 Yes 5-2 No 6-3
Had the same five Justices voted (i) that Miller had standing to raise
the sex discrimination claim; (ii) that the law unconstitutionally dis-
criminated based on sex; and (iii) that the Court had the power to is-
sue the requested remedy, Miller obviously would have won the case.
It would be irrational for any individual Justice to have voted for
Miller on all three issues, yet vote that she should lose the case. Yet
that is precisely what the Court in its collective decision-making
concluded.
The consequences flowing from the irrationality of a decision like
Miller are more than intellectually unappealing. They create insur-
mountable difficulties for those who try to understand the law, espe-
cially those who are duty-bound to follow the Court's interpretation of
the supreme law of the land. Unsurprisingly, lower courts attempting
to interpret Miller were unable to agree on how to deal with its confus-
ing outcome.
Some courts described Miller as declaring that gender discrimina-
tion is almost always going to be unconstitutional. For example, in
Rainey v. Chever,9 3 the Georgia Supreme Court struck down an inher-
itance law which prevented biological fathers from inheriting from
their illegitimate children if they failed to provide support for the
child.94 The Georgia court, finding the differential treatment of fa-
thers and mothers violated equal protection, relied on the following
characterization of Miller: "[The Supreme] Court agreed it would be
93. 510 S.E.2d 823 (Ga. 1999), cert denied, 527 U.S. 1044 (1999).
94. Id. The statute stated that "neither the father nor any child of the father nor any
other paternal kin shall inherit from or through a child born out of wedlock if it
shall be established by a preponderance of evidence that the father failed or re-
fused openly to treat the child as his own or failed or refused to provide support
for the child." GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-4(b)(2) (1996).
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unlikely that any gender classification based on stereotypes could sur-
vive heightened scrutiny."9 5
Other courts extracted precisely the opposite holding from Miller.
In the words of one judge, "the [Miller] Court held that it is not an
equal protection violation to impose certain requirements on children
claiming citizenship through their fathers while not imposing those
same requirements on children claiming citizenship through their
mothers."9 6
Three years after Miller, the constitutionality of the same provi-
sion of the Immigration and Naturalization Act again reached the Su-
preme Court. Unlike in Miller, the Court in Nguyen v. INS97 was able
to reach a majority decision. Because the father brought suit in that
case, there was no lack of standing to raise the gender discrimination
claim. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy who found no standing in
Miller, parted ways in Nguyen, with Kennedy writing the majority
opinion holding that the naturalization law did not constitute unlaw-
ful sex discrimination. Joining him were Justice Stevens and Chief
Justice Rehnquist who voiced the same view in Miller, as well as Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas who concluded that federal courts lack the
remedial power to confer citizenship in a manner other than that pro-
vided for in the statute.98
95. Rainey, 510 S.E.2d at 824; accord Lake v. Reno, 226 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2000); see
also United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1999)
("[H]ad the facts in Miller been like those in this case, a majority of the Court
would have found [the law] unconstitutional by applying heightened scrutiny.").
96. United States v. Gomez-Orozco, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1094 (C.D. Ill. 1998), rev'd
on other grounds, 188 F.3d 422 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Rainey, 527 U.S. at 1047
(1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("[Wihile the fractured
decision in Miller may demonstrate the need for additional guidance as to the
constitutionality of laws differentiating between fathers and mothers of out-of-
wedlock children, it does not stand for the proposition that all generalizations
based on gender are constitutionally infirm."); Nguyen v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 528,
533 (5th Cir. 2000) (upholding sex discrimination in immigration law, in part,
because, "The [Miller] court found that the statute met several important govern-
mental objectives .... ."), affd, 533 U.S 53 (2001); Breyer v. Meissner, 23 F. Supp.
2d 521 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (granting deference to Congress in matters of immigra-
tion, even when they involve sex discrimination).
97. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
98. Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion which Justice Thomas joined, stating
that he still believed "the Court lacks power to provide relief of the sort requested
in this suit . . . ." Id. at 73 (Scalia, J., concurring). He reasoned, however, that
because the majority in Miller concluded the Court did have such power, and a
majority in Nguyen was proceeding on that assumption, it was "appropriate" to
reach the merits of the equal protection claims. Id. at 73-74. It is noteworthy
that Justice Scalia seems to be implying that the five votes on the issue garnered
from the different opinions in Miller were worthy of comparable respect to the
votes comprising the majority in the Court's opinion in Nguyen.
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In Nguyen, when Justice Kennedy described the votes of the vari-
ous Justices in Miller, he made an interesting omission and described
the splintered Miller vote as follows:
Four justices, in two different opinions, rejected the challenge to the gender-
based distinction, two finding the statute consistent with the Fifth Amend-
ment (opinion of [Stevens], J., joined by [Rehnquist], C.J.), and two concluding
that the court could not confer citizenship as a remedy even if the statute
violated equal protection ([Scalia], J., joined by [Thomas], J., concurring in
judgment). Three Justices reached a contrary result, and would have found
the statute violative of equal protection. ([Ginsburg], J., joined by [Souter]
and [Breyer], JJ., dissenting); ([Breyer], J., joined by [Souter] and [Ginsburg],
JJ., dissenting). Finally, two Justices did not reach the issue as to the father,
having determined that the child, the only petitioner in Miller, lacked stand-
ing to raise the equal protection rights of his father. ([O'Connor], J., joined by
[Kennedy], J., concurring in judgment).9 9
Curiously, Justice Kennedy did not mention the following statement
made by Justice O'Conner and which he joined, indicating that the
law could not survive an equal protection challenge: "Although I do
not share Justice [Stevens'] assessment that the provision withstands
heightened scrutiny . . . I believe it passes rational scrutiny for the
reasons he gives for sustaining it under the higher standard."10 0
Abandoning this earlier conclusion, Justice Kennedy proceeded to
find that the naturalization law did indeed meet the mid-level scru-
tiny test for sex discrimination. He found the law was substantially
related to the two important goals of: (i) "assuring that a biological
parent-child relationship exists" between the citizen parent and child;
and (ii) "ensur[ing] that the child and the citizen parent have some
demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop . . .a relationship
that ... consists of the real, everyday ties that provide a connection
between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States."1O1
According to Justice Kennedy, insisting on gender-neutral rules for
accomplishing these purposes would be, "[t]o fail to acknowledge even
our most basic biological differences .... The difference between men
and women in relation to the birth process is a real one, and the prin-
ciple of equal protection does not forbid Congress to address the prob-
lem at hand in a manner specific to each gender."10 2
Speaking for four Justices, Justice O'Connor wrote an angry dis-
sent in which she derided Justice Kennedy's opinion, noting it is no
more than anachronistic "stereotype, to say that fathers who are pre-
sent at birth lack an opportunity for a relationship on similar terms
99. Id. at 58 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
100. Miller, 523 U.S. 420, 451-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
101. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62-65.
102. Id. at 73.
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[with mothers]."103 She concluded her attack by focusing on the ma-
jority's sloppy use of precedent:
No one should mistake the majority's analysis for a careful application of this
Court's equal protection jurisprudence concerning sex-based classifications.
Today's decision instead represents a deviation from a line of cases in which
we have vigilantly applied heightened scrutiny to such classifications to deter-
mine whether a constitutional violation has occurred. 1 0 4
Miller thus demonstrates that even when each individual Justice
is acting rationally, the nature of the Supreme Court's decision-mak-
ing is such that the possibility of irrational outcomes can never be
eliminated. Miller is one example of the Irrationality Theorem in
action.
B. Proof of the Irrationality Theorem
This section offers a formal proof of the Irrationality Theorem. As
with all proofs, it is necessary to begin by defining its terms.
An "outcome" is the ultimate determination as to which of two par-
ties prevails. Of course there are more than two possible dispositions
of a case by the Supreme Court. A lower court ruling can be affirmed,
it can be reversed and remanded, or it can be dismissed. A dismissal,
however, will favor one party or the other, usually the defendant in
the original law suit. Thus, if the defendant prevails in the court of
appeals, either a dismissal or an affirmance by the Supreme Court
represents a victory for defendant. This can also be termed "winning
the case."
An "issue" is a question before the Court whose resolution can di-
rectly determine the outcome of a case. 10 5
Two issues are "sequential" if the following conditions are met: (i)
one of the issues (the "preliminary issue") must be resolved in order
for the Court to reach the other issue (the "secondary issue"); (ii) if one
party prevails on the preliminary issue the Court reaches the secon-
dary issue, but if the other party prevails on the preliminary issue, it
wins the case; and (iii) whenever the secondary issue is reached by the
Court, whoever prevails on that issue wins the case. 10 6
103. Id. at 87 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She suggested several gender-neutral means
for accomplishing the governmental purposes, such as a requirement that the
parent be present at birth or have knowledge of birth. Id. at 88.
104. Id. at 97.
105. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimem-
ber Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2304 (1999) (describing the "basic legal issues
on whose resolution the proper case disposition depends").
106. The determination of when an issue is "preliminary" is more a matter of law than
of logic. For example, in order to constrain the power of the Court, issues as to
jurisdiction are generally decided before the Court reaches the substance of an
issue. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998).
Similarly, when faced with both a statutory and constitutional issue, the Court
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For example, a plaintiff must prevail on jurisdiction, the prelimi-
nary issue, before reaching the merits of the claim, the secondary is-
sue. If the defendant wins on jurisdiction, the defendant wins without
the need to discuss the merits. If the plaintiff wins on jurisdiction, the
court will decide the merits, and whoever prevails on the merits wins
the case. 107
Two issues are "independent" if they are not sequential. For exam-
ple, if a law prohibiting unmarried people from using birth control is
challenged on both equal protection and due process grounds, a find-
ing of either violation results in the law being struck down. That is,
the resolution of one issue does not affect the Court's resolution of the
other issue.
Where two independent issues are presented, there are four ways
an individual Justice can vote. Either the plaintiff wins on both is-
sues; the defendant wins both issues, the plaintiff wins the first but
loses the second, or plaintiff wins the second but loses the first. A
"unified vote" occurs in the first two situations where one party
prevails on all of the issues. The latter two scenarios, where each
party prevails on only one of the two issues can be termed "split
votes."
Two issues (either sequential or independent) are "distinct" if for
all possible combinations of votes, none would be irrational.1os
A particular issue or outcome is a "loser" if its negation receives the
votes of a majority of the Court. "Negation" means the logical dichoto-
mous inverse: one party either wins or loses; a particular clause either
applies or does not apply. Thus, if a majority of Justices vote that the
Court has power to declare someone a citizen, the proposition that the
Court does not have such power is a "loser."' 0 9
will resolve the statutory issue first, in order to be able to avoid a constitutional
decision if possible. See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
107. Just because the secondary issue does not need to be addressed if the primary
issue is resolved a certain way, does not mean the secondary issue will not be
discussed by the Justices. A Justice may rationally present a "conditional" analy-
sis, finding no jurisdiction and then discussing the merits after declaring, "If
there is jurisdiction . . . ." Thus, it is often possible to determine each Justice's
view on the secondary issue, even if some believe the primary issue will conclude
the case.
108. Because the conclusion that a law passes the compelling interest test cannot ra-
tionally coexist with the conclusion that the same law fails mid-level scrutiny, the
issues of whether mid-level and compelling interest scrutiny are met are not "dis-
tinct" issues.
109. The definition of "loser" does not include situations where some Justices decline
to address a particular issue. For example, consider a case where four Justices
find no jurisdiction but say nothing about the merits, another four find jurisdic-
tion and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and one finds jurisdiction and
no violation of equal protection. In such a case, a majority (4+1) finds jurisdic-
tion, so the proposition that there is no jurisdiction is a "loser." Since there is not
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The "result" of the case is the resolution of the outcome and the
relevant issues.
"Rational" means logically consistent.
"Irrational" means logically inconsistent.
An "irrational result" occurs if one party is a loser on every issue in
a case and wins the case anyway. Obviously, if there is only one issue
in a case, it is irrational for one side to prevail on that issue and lose
on the ultimate outcome. Similarly, if there are multiple issues, it is
irrational if one side prevails on all of the issues and loses on the ulti-
mate outcome. 1 10
The Irrationality Theorem can now be stated as follows: Even
when each individual judge or justice is voting in a rational manner,
for any court with at least three members deciding a case with at least
two distinct issues, there is a possibility that the result will be
irrational.
The proof of the Irrationality Theorem is straight-forward. Begin
with the simplest situation of two parties and two distinct issues.1"1
We will treat the situation, first, where the two issues are sequential,
then where they are independent.
If the issues are sequential, the preliminary issue (e.g., jurisdic-
tion), must be won by one party (the plaintiff) in order to get the Court
to consider the secondary issue (e.g., the merits). The only way for the
plaintiff to win the case is to win on both jurisdiction and the merits.
If the plaintiff loses on jurisdiction, the defendant wins, even if the
plaintiff would have won a majority on the merits. Obviously, if the
plaintiff wins on jurisdiction and loses on the merits, the defendant
also wins the case. Thus, under both split-vote scenarios, the plaintiff
winning on jurisdiction and losing on the merits, and the plaintiff win-
ning on the merits but losing on jurisdiction, the defendant wins the
case. Stated generally, if there are two distinct sequential issues, the
same party (here, the defendant) will win each split-vote permutation.
Similarly, if there are two distinct independent issues, the same
party will win each split-vote permutation. This can be proven by
utilizing the mathematical technique known as reductio ad absurdum:
prove that a contradiction will inevitably arise if the opposite of your
desired conclusion is assumed. 1 12 Thus, we begin by assuming that a
at least five votes for either side on the equal protection issue, neither view of
that clause is a "loser" for this case.
110. This, of course, is what happened in Miller, and is the focus of this Article.
111. If there are more than two issues, the analysis would be identical if all of the
voters unanimously place all but the same two options at the bottom of their list
of preferences.
112. The technique of reductio ad absurdum, sometimes known as an indirect proof,
has been utilized since 400 B.C.E. CARL BOYER, A HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS 66
(2d ed., revised by Uta Merzbach, 1991).
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different party would win the case depending on which of the two
split-vote scenarios occurred. We can chart this story by letting De-
fendant win the case if he wins on Issue A and loses on Issue B, and
letting Plaintiff win the case if she wins on Issue A and loses on Issue
B.113
ISSUE A
Plaintiff wins Issue A Defendant wins Issue A
Plaintiff wins P wins A D wins A
Issue B P wins B P wins B
P WINS CASE D WINS CASE
I II
ISSUE B Defendant wins P wins A D wins A
Issue B D wins B D wins B
P WINS CASE D WINS CASE
III IV
The above chart reveals that, in all four voting possibilities, whoever
wins Issue A wins the case. The resolution of Issue B never controls
the outcome of the case. Because we have defined an issue as a ques-
tion that "can determine directly the outcome of a case," Issue B can-
not be considered an issue. Thus, we have a contradiction.
Accordingly, the assumption that the two split-vote scenarios lead to a
different party winning the case must be erroneous. Therefore, we
can conclude that the same party will win the case for each split-vote
permutation whenever there are two distinct independent issues.
Therefore, in any case with two distinct issues, either sequential or
independent, we have the identical result: under either split-vote per-
mutation, the same party wins the case. 1 14
Next, let X be any even number, such that there are X + 1 Justices.
This ensures an odd number of voters. 1 15 Note that 1h X is always less
than a majority because 1/2 X is less than 1/2 (X + 1). In particular, on
the Supreme Court, there are 8 + 1 Justices, and 1/2 of 8, or 4, is less
than a majority. On the other hand, (1/2 X + 1) is always enough for a
majority (on the Supreme Court, 4 + 1 = 5, constituting a majority).
Similarly, X is always sufficient for a majority (on the Court, 8 is a
majority).
Assume there are two distinct issues and it is therefore rational for
an individual Justice to either vote in favor of the same party on both
113. The proof is the same if we switch who wins which scenario.
114. Note that not every case has the plaintiff winning on a split decision. If a crimi-
nal defendant argues that his constitutional rights were violated because his con-
fession was coerced and the police search was unreasonable, the defendant need
only prevail on one of these defenses to avoid conviction. If there is a "split deci-
sion," therefore, the defendant wins the case.
115. Note that this proof assumes that the number of Justices is odd.
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issues or split his or her vote. In one permissible breakdown of votes,
'A X of the Justices vote for one split-vote permutation, and 'A X of the
Justices vote for the other split-vote permutation. Note that it has
already been shown that the same party (for this example, assume it
is "Defendant") will prevail under either split-vote alternative. Now,
assume that the remaining Justice selects the unified vote in which
the other party ("Plaintiff") wins. For the Supreme Court, this would
be the same as if four Justices vote for one split-vote permutation, four
Justices vote for the other split-vote permutation, and the remaining
Justice votes for Plaintiff on both issues.
With the vote of that remaining Justice, a majority (1/2 X + 1 or 5)
has voted for the plaintiff on each of the two issues. However, since
Defendant wins on either split-vote permutation, he wins the case be-
cause a majority of voters (X out of X + 1, or 8 out of 9) have voted with
split votes. That is, the majority decision on both issues is in Plaintiff
's favor, yet the majority has voted that Defendant wins the case. The
Court has thus reached an irrational result. While this does not mean
that the Court will reach an irrational result in every case involving
two distinct issues, what is certain is that, in such a case, there is a
real possibility that the Court will collectively reach an irrational
result.116
116. Irrational results can be achieved through many voting permutations other than
the one utilized in the proof. Consider the following matrix of voting possibilities.
(For the sake of this example, Plaintiff will be the prevailing party in the event of
a split vote.)
ISSUE A
Plaintiff wins Issue A Defendant wins Issue A
Plaintiff wins P wins A D wins A
Issue B P wins B P wins B
P WINS CASE P WINS CASE
I II
ISSUE B Defendant wins P wins A D wins A
Issue B D wins B D wins B
P WINS CASE D WINS CASE
III IV
Assume there are two distinct issues and no majority opinion. If the votes for the
split decisions (II + III) total a majority, Plaintiff wins the case. If the only other
votes are for Defendant to win both issues (IV), there will be an irrational result.
Plaintiff will win this case, but Defendant will win a majority for each issue.
More generally, any time there is no majority opinion, but the sum of each voting
combination (II + III), (I + IV), and (III + IV) equals a majority, there will be an
irrational decision.
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C. When Will Irrationality Arise?
Obviously, most cases do not produce an irrational result. Thus,
the next step is to determine when an irrational result is likely to oc-
cur. Although many commentators have attempted to describe the
necessary conditions for irrationality, failure to recognize the inher-
ently mathematical nature of the problem has led many to mis-diag-
nose the problem.
For example, John Rogers claims that an irrational decision "po-
tentially arises every time a majority is made up of (i) a plurality, and
(ii) a concurrence that refuses to adopt a necessary portion of the plu-
rality's analysis. This occurs whenever there is any substantive dif-
ference in the holdings of a plurality decision and a concurrence."117
As seen in the previous section, however, irrationality does not depend
upon a plurality opinion. A sufficient number of split votes can
achieve this result.
To confirm, consider a criminal defendant raising the issues of: (i)
whether the confession was coerced; and (ii) whether the police search
was improper.
Was the confession coerced?
Prosecution wins Defendant wins
Confession Issue Confession Issue
Prosecution wins P wins Confession D wins Confession
Search Issue Issue Issue
P wins Search Issue P wins Search Issue
P WINS CASE D WINS CASE
I II
Was the search Defendant wins P wins Confession D wins Confession
improper? Search Issue Issue Issue
D wins Search Issue D wins Search Issue
D WINS CASE D WINS CASE
III IV
Now suppose the nine Justices are evenly split three ways, with three
votes each for options I, II, and III. There are therefore six votes for
Prosecution (the government) to win the confession issue (I + III) and
six votes for Prosecution to win on the search issue (I + II). Nonethe-
less, Defendant wins the case with 6 votes (II + III). Thus, irrational-
ity arises even without a plurality opinion.
Secondly, Rogers' analysis understates both the number of differ-
ent opinions and the requisite disagreement between them which is
necessary for an irrational opinion. It is not enough that there be a
substantive difference between a plurality and concurrence. Rather,
there needs to be at least three options that disagree with each other
117. Rogers, I Vote This Way, supra note 29, at 443-444.
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in the following manner: (i) there is at least one issue in each opinion
which is resolved in favor of a different party than in the other two
opinions; and (ii) at least two of the opinions which reach the same
conclusion as to who should ultimately prevail must resolve at least
two issues in favor of different parties."18
Maxwell Stearns is similarly incorrect in his conclusion that the
same conditions that lead to the lack of transitivity (or cycling) de-
scribed by Condorcet and Arrow lead to irrational results.119 In fact,
cases with cycling need not end in an irrational result, and cases with
irrational results need not contain cycling.
One can observe a situation where cycling does not create an irra-
tional result by returning to the Pentagon Papers hypothetical.120
The division between the Justices in that example created a cycle be-
tween three choices: the injunction "violates both separation of powers
118. Returning to the simplest matrix and comparing the voting combinations dis-
cussed supra note 116, we see that those voting in cells II and III both conclude
that Plaintiff wins but are diametrically opposed on two issues. Meanwhile,
those voting in cells II and IV and those voting in cells III and IV disagree on who
should ultimately prevail and are diametrically opposed on one issue.
ISSUE A
Plaintiff wins Issue A Defendant wins Issue A
Plaintiff wins P wins A D wins A
Issue B P wins B P wins B
P WINS CASE P WINS CASE
I II
ISSUE B Defendant wins P wins A D wins A
Issue B D wins B D wins B
P WINS CASE D WINS CASE
III IV
The proof that an irrational opinion from a court requires there must be at least
two opinions which reach the same conclusion as to who should ultimately pre-
vail and reach diametrically opposed conclusions as to two or more issues is sim-
ple. First, to avoid having two such opinions, there can be no more than one split
decision (since split decisions by definition differ from each other on at least two
issues). If, for example, the only split decision in the above matrix was cell II,
then assuming no majority opinion, the same party would not prevail on all is-
sues. Plaintiff would win on Issue B (votes in cells I and IV), but Defendant
would win on Issue A (votes in cells II and IV). In such a case, by definition, there
would not be an irrational opinion.
119. See, e.g., Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 22, at 1930 (referring to the voting
anomaly, i.e., the irrational result, occurring when there is a "possible set of cycli-
cal preferences" and "no Condorcet winner is available"); Steams, Should Jus-
tices Ever Switch Votes, supra note 29, at 156 (describing his analysis of cases
with irrational results as focused on "the relevant grouping in which a collective
intransitivity has the potential to occur"); see also Rogers, I Vote This Way, supra
note 29, at 466 ("This anomaly is closely related to the possibility of 'cycling.'").
120. See supra text accompanying note 44.
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and the First Amendment"; the injunction "violates only separation of
powers but not the First Amendment"; and the injunction "violates
only the First Amendment but not separation of powers."12 1 Nonethe-
less, because a majority of Justices voted that the newspaper should
win on each issue, and all of the Justices voted that the newspaper
should win the case, there was no irrational result. Thus, the condi-
tions that lead to cycling do not necessarily lead to irrational results.
Similarly, the conditions that cause irrational results need not lead
to cycling. Consider this simplified version of the vote in Miller. To
make the chart easier to follow, the separation of powers issue is elim-
inated and Justices Scalia and Thomas are assumed to vote as they
did in the subsequent case of Nguyen, that Miller had standing but
that the law did not violate equal protection. Thus, they vote the
same way Justice Stevens did. In such a case the voting breakdown
appears as follows:
Author of opinion Does Miller have Does law's gender- Does Miller
and number of Jus- standing to raise her based distinction vio- win?
tices joining the opin- father's constitutional late equal protection?
ion claim?
Stevens (2) Yes (2) No (2) No (2)
Scalia (2) Yes (2) No (2) No (2)
O'Connor (2) No (2) Yes (2) No (2)
Breyer (3) Yes (3) Yes (3) Yes (3)
TOTAL Yes 7-2 Yes 5-2 No 6-3
As in the actual case, this is an irrational result because Miller pre-
vailed on all relevant issues but lost the case.
It is not, however, inevitable that the opinions in this case re-
present the sort of cycling, or lack of transitivity, described by Arrow.
121. The Justices' preference order was:
Marshall,. White, Douglas, Black, Harlan, Burger,
Stewart Brennan Blackmun
[3 votes] [3 votes] [3 votes]
1 Violates Both Only Violates Only Violates
1st Amendment Sep of Powers
PREFERENCE 2 Only Violates Violates Both Only Violates
ORDER Sep of Powers 1st Amendment
3 Only Violates 1st Only Violates Violates Both
Amendment Sep of Powers
4 Not Violate Not Violate Not Violate
Either Either Either
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To see why, it is necessary to examine the preference order for each
group of Justices.
There are four possibilities from which the Justices can choose:
I. Standing and Equal Protection Violation;
II. No Standing and Equal Protection Violation;
III. Standing and No Equal Protection Violation; or
IV. No Standing and No Equal Protection Violation.
Because no Justice detailed a full preference order for all four options,
some assumptions must be made. First, since each opinion revealed a
preference for one combination, it is plausible to assume that the op-
posite combination would have been the least preferred of the author.
Second, if we assume for ranking second and third-choice preferences
that each of the Justices care more about their preferred views on
equal protection than on standing, the presumed preference order
chart can be completed as follows:
Stevens, Rehnquist, Breyer, Souter,
Scalia, Thomas O'Connor, Kennedy Ginsburg
[4 votes] [2 votes] [3 votes]
1 Standing, Not No Standing, Standing,
Violate Equal Pro Violates Equal Pro Violates Equal
Pro
PREFERENCE 2 No Standing, Not Standing, Violates No Standing,
ORDER Violate Equal Pro Equal Pro Violates Equal
Pro
3 Standing, Violates No Standing, Not Standing, Not
Equal Pro Violate Equal Pro Violate Equal
Pro
4 No Standing, Standing, Not No Standing,
Violates Equal Pro Violate Equal Pro Not Violate
Equal Pro
The chart reveals no cycling, or lack of transitivity, because one
choice, "Standing and Violates Equal Pro," prevails over all three re-
maining options in head-to-head votes. Five Justices (led by Breyer
and O'Connor) prefer "Standing and Violates Equal Pro" to either
"Standing and Not Violate Equal Pro" or "No Standing and Not Vio-
late Equal Pro." Seven Justices (led by Breyer and Stevens) prefer
"Standing and Violates Equal Pro" to "No Standing and Violates
Equal Pro." Thus, "Standing and Violates Equal Pro" is the Condorcet
winner. 122 There is no cycling, even though the voting pattern re-
sulted in an irrational decision. Since we have already seen that cy-
122. The reason the winner of the case was not the Condorcet winner is because Jus-
tices do not decide cases using Condorcet's head-to-head technique. Although
"Standing" and "Equal Pro Violation" were both selected by a majority, the out-
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cling does not necessarily result in an irrational opinion, one can
conclude that the same conditions do not lead to both cycling and irra-
tional opinions.
To discern the necessary and sufficient conditions for an irrational
decision to occur, one must first look at the breakdown of votes leading
one party to lose on every issue but win the case anyway. If there is
only one issue, no rational Justice can vote in favor of one party on the
issue, but vote against that party on winning the case. Thus, there
must be at least two distinct issues. 12 3 Next, there cannot be a major-
ity opinion because the rational reasoning of the majority opinion
would preclude an irrational result. That is, the Court must split
come of the case does not rationally follow from this Court's resolution of the
relevant issues.
123. Sometimes, a case with multiple issues can be reduced to two issues by breaking
up the way the issues are considered. For example, in Miller, there were three
issues-standing, separation of powers, and equal protection. By dividing the
votes into two categories (jurisdiction and merits) the case is reduced to two dis-
tinct issues:
I. Jurisdiction
Author of opinion and Does the Court Does law's gender-based Does Miller
number of Justices have jurisdiction? distinction violate equal win?
joining the opinion protection?
Stevens (2) Yes (2) No (2) No (2)
O'Connor (2) No (2) Yes (2) Not (2)
Scalia (2) No (2) Not Say (2) No (2)
Breyer (3) Yes (3) Yes (3) Yes (3)
TOTAL Yes 5-4 Yes 5-2 Yes 6-3
A majority of the Court, in a rational vote, decides they have jurisdiction to hear
the case.
II. Merits
Author of opinion and Does the Court Does law's gender-based Does Miller
number of Justices have jurisdiction? distinction violate equal win?
joining the opinion protection?
Stevens (2) Yes (2) No (2) No (2)
O'Connor (2) No (2) Yes (2) Not (2)
Scalia (2) No (2) Not Say (2) No (2)
Breyer (3) Yes (3) Yes (3) Yes (3)
TOTAL Yes 5-4 Yes 5-2 Yes 6-3
This is the same irrational decision as the original framework, but reduced to two
distinct issues.
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among at least three opinions containing at least three different vot-
ing permutations.
To understand how these votes must be divided in order to gener-
ate an irrational opinion, the critical observation is that in a case
where there are two issues, the same party can win the case by win-
ning either of the split votes.12 4 Since each party wins the case for one
of the two unified votes, it is evident that one of the parties can win
the case by prevailing on either of the split votes or one of the unified
votes (three of the four possible voting permutations).
To determine what conditions are necessary to create irrational
opinions, one can begin by charting the voting permutations of two
distinct issues. Assume that the parties are "Defendant" and "Plain-
tiff' and that Defendant is the party who wins the case if there is a
split vote. 125 The chart of the voting possibilities would then be as
follows:
ISSUE A
Plaintiff wins Issue A Defendant wins Issue A
Plaintiff wins P wins A D wins A
Issue B P wins B P wins B
P WINS CASE P WINS CASE
I II
ISSUE B Defendant wins P wins A D wins A
Issue B D wins B D wins B
P WINS CASE D WINS CASE
III IV
In our example, an irrational result is obtained only if Plaintiff
wins the case, but Defendant receives a majority vote on each issue.
An irrational result cannot be obtained in the reverse way, meaning
that for our scenario, Plaintiff wins on each issue but Defendant wins
the case. This is because the only voting permutation under which
Defendant wins is by winning on both issues. Thus, the only way for
Defendant to win is by having a majority of Justices vote that she wins
on both issues (cell IV). If that were to happen, Defendant would both
win on each issue and win the case, so there would not be an irrational
result. Thus, were an irrational opinion to arise from this fact pat-
tern, it must be Defendant who receives a majority vote on each issue
while Plaintiff wins the case.
Defendant wins on issue A only if adding the number of votes in
the right hand column (II + IV) equal a majority. Similarly, Defen-
124. See supra text accompanying note 116.
125. As previously discussed, it is not necessarily true that the plaintiff is the party
who must win on both distinct issues to win the case. See supra text accompany-
ing note 116.
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dant wins on issue B only if adding the number of votes in the bottom
row (III + IV) equal a majority. More generally, the party who must
win on both issues in order to win the case will win on each issue only
if the sums from adding the votes for his only winning permutation
separately to each of the split decisions separately total a majority.
Plaintiff wins the case by either winning one of the split votes (II or
III) or the unified vote for which he wins both of the issues (I). Thus,
Plaintiff wins the case if the sum of the votes in all three of these
permutations is a majority, that is, if the votes in I + II + III yield a
majority of the votes cast. In more general terms, if the sum of those
who select the split votes added to those who choose the unified vote
which leads to the same result total a majority, the party who wins the
case when there are split votes wins the case. 12 6
The requirements for an irrational opinion are, therefore, as
follows:
(i) There must be at least two distinct issues;
(ii) There cannot be a majority opinion;
(iii) There must be a minimum of three opinions such that:
a. There is at least one issue in each opinion which is resolved in
favor of a different party than in the other two opinions; and
126. This mathematical approach permits a more precise description than social
choice analysis which describes the conditions for irrationality as "multidimen-
sionality and asymmetry." See, e.g., Stearns, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes,
supra note 29, at 156. Multidimensionality can be most easily understood by con-
trasting it with "unidimensionality." A question is unidimensional when the dif-
ferent options can be arrayed on a spectrum, where those who hold either
extreme position would prefer a median position to the opposite extreme. Id. at
116-17. Thus, the question of whether to put no salt, a little salt, or a lot of salt
in a soup is unidimensional since, in most cases, those who prefer either no salt
or a lot of salt would prefer the moderate approach as their second choice. By
contrast, if the question involves the possibility of placing more than one ingredi-
ent, such as salt and/or carrots in the soup, no such linear ranking is possible,
and that question would be deemed multidimensional. Id. at 128. Thus, mu-
litdimensionality basically refers to the same concept as two distinct issues.
According to Professor Sterns, "Asymmetry arises when two camps resolve
each of the two dispositive issues in opposite fashion, but nonetheless reach the
same judgment." Maxwell L. Stearns, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Judicial
Decisionmaking: A Reply to Saul Levmore, 3 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 125, 144 (2002).
This definition, though, is merely a tautology. Whenever Justices divide between
split-vote possibilities, the two camps can resolve each issue in opposite fashion,
but nonetheless reach the same judgment. In other words, every case which ex-
hibits multidimensionality (i.e., two issues) will invariably exhibit asymmetry
(i.e., the result of either split vote is that the same party wins the case) when
different Justices select each split-vote option.
Professor Nash, utilizing a more mathematical approach, comes closer to ob-
taining a full description of when irrationality occurs. Nash, supra note 29, at
80-82. Nonetheless, his analysis, like Stearn's, does not reflect the fact that in
every situation with two split-vote permutations, opposing majorities on each is-
sue will lead to the same judgment. Id. at 81. Thus, his analysis omits the fact
that only one party can be the victor in an irrational case.
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b. At least two of the opinions which reach the same conclusion as
to who should ultimately prevail must resolve at least two issues in
favor of different parties; and
(iv) For cases with only two issues, the votes of the Justices are di-
vided in such a way that:
a. The combined votes for the party who prevails in both split deci-
sions total a majority (so that he wins the case); and
b. The sums from adding the unified votes for the other party sep-
arately to each of the split decisions total a majority (so that she wins
on each issue). 127
127. From this set of requirements, it follows that when there are exactly two issues:
(i) The only party who can win the case is the one who prevails when there is a
split vote, see supra note 126 and accompanying text; and (ii) There must be at
least one vote for each split-vote permutation. (This follows from the require-
ment that the sums obtained from adding the unified votes for the party who
loses the case separately to each of the split decisions total a majority, since that
party cannot otherwise prevail on each issue.)
When there are more than two distinct issues, the situation can get much
more complicated. The number of split-vote scenarios increases rapidly (e.g., if
there are three issues, there are six split-vote permutations, if there are four is-
sues, there are fourteen). Moreover, it is no longer inevitable that the same party
will prevail under every split-vote permutation.
The situation is further complicated because of the different structures cases
with multiple issues can take. For some situations with multiple issues, one
party must prevail on all issues to win the case. For example, a private school
faced with losing a tax break because of its racially discriminatory admissions
policies claimed that the I.R.S was violating its rights to the free exercise of relig-
ion, to free association, and to due process and equal protection of the laws. Bob
Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 735-736 (1974). In order to win the case, the
government needed to prevail on every issue.
By contrast, in some cases of more than two issues, different parties can win
split decisions. For example, in Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392 (1998), a
white criminal defendant challenged his conviction on the grounds that racial
discrimination against African-Americans occurred during the selection of grand
jurors. For the defendant to prevail, he needed to win on the standing issue, and
on either the equal protection or due process claims. Thus, both parties could win
a split decision. The defendant could win the case by winning on only two of three
issues (standing and either equal protection or due process) and the government
could win by winning on only two of three issues (standing and due process).
Despite the complexities of cases with multiple issues, the basic principles of
irrationality still hold. An irrational result for more than two distinct issues al-
ways requires that there be no majority opinion, that there be votes for at least
two split-vote permutations, and that there be a minimum of three options such
that: (i) any two opinions resolve at least one issue in favor of different parties;
and (ii) at least one pair of opinions resolves two or more issues in favor of differ-
ent parties.
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D. The Irrationality Theorem in Action
In the past sixty years, the Supreme Court has issued numerous
irrational decisions in addition to Miller. 128 In the interest of brevity,
this Article shall discuss in detail one recent such case, Eastern Enter-
prises v. Apfel,129 while summarizing the others in the Appendix.
Eastern Enterprises involved a challenge to the retroactive applica-
tion of the Coal Act 13o which was enacted in 1992. The Act required
Eastern Enterprises, a company that had sold its coal producing busi-
ness in 1965, to contribute approximately $50 million for health bene-
fits of former employees. 13 1 There were two main issues in the case:
(i) whether the application of the Coal Act deprived Eastern Enter-
prises of its property in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment;13 2 and (ii) whether the Coal Act's retroactive application
violated the Due Process Clause.
There were three main opinions in the case. Justice O'Connor
wrote the plurality opinion for herself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices Scalia and Thomas, finding the Coal Act unconstitutional.
Her opinion stated that the Coal Act violated the Takings Clause be-
cause it required Eastern Enterprises to bear the substantial expense
of "lifetime health benefits for miners based on its activities decades
before those benefits were promised."133 While not definitively decid-
ing the due process question, the opinion expressed strong "concerns
about using the Due Process Clause to invalidate economic
legislation."13 4
128. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998);
Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990); Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110 (1989); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582
(1983); Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980); Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404 (1972); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S.
759 (1972); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.,
394 U.S. 759 (1969); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967); James v.
United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Nat'l
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
129. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
130. Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act (Coal Act) of 1992, 26 U.S.C.
§§ 9701-9722 (1994 & Supp. II).
131. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 530-31 (plurality opinion).
132. The Takings Clause states: "Nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
133. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 537 (plurality opinion).
134. Id. Justice O'Conner for the plurality noted that because the Coal Act "violates
the Takings Clause as applied to Eastern, we need not address Eastern's due
process claim." Id. at 538. The antipathy the plurality felt towards finding a sub-
stantive due process violation can be seen in the two quotations given to support
their "concerns." First, the plurality noted the Court's "abandonment of the use
of the 'vague contours' of the Due Process Clause to nullify laws which a majority
of the Court believe to be economically unwise." Id. at 537 (quoting Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963)). Next, the plurality repeated its declaration
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Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion on behalf of himself alone. He
stated that the Takings Clause was not violated by the Coal Act be-
cause it did not "affect an obligation relating to a specific property in-
terest."13 5 Nonetheless, he stated the Coal Act was unconstitutional
as violative of "due process restrictions against severe retroactive
legislation." 136
Finally, Justice Breyer wrote a dissent for himself and Justices
Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter. This opinion declared the Coal Act
constitutional. Breyer agreed with Kennedy that the Takings Clause
did not apply because the Coal Act did not affect "an interest in physi-
cal or intellectual property, but [imposed] an ordinary liability to pay
money."137 Breyer also found the Coal Act did not violate the Due
Process Clause because it was not "fundamentally unfair" to impose
liability, especially when Eastern Enterprises had, "until 1987, contin-
ued to draw sizable profits from the coal industry through a wholly
owned subsidiary." 138
By charting the votes of the different Justices, one can see the ex-
traordinary result: a majority of the Justices voted against Eastern
Enterprises on both of the issues, yet the company won the case. The
following chart summarizes the reasoning and conclusion of the opin-
ions in Eastern Enterprises:
Author of opinion Does the Takings Does the retroactive Does Eastern
and number of Jus- Clause apply to im- aspect of the Coal Enterprises win?
tices joining the position of retroac- Act violate substan-
opinion tive liability by the tive due process?
Coal Act?
O'Connor (4) Yes (4) No (4) Yes (4)
Kennedy (1) No (1) Yes (1) Yes (1)
Breyer (4) No (4) No (4) No (4)
TOTAL No 5-4 No 8-1 Yes 5-4
that, "The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause ... to strike
down . . . laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they
may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought." Id. at 537-38 (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S.
483, 488 (1955)). Moreover, if all four Justices signing on to the plurality opinion
had been willing to rely on the Due Process Clause, they could have established,
with Justice Kennedy's fifth vote, a majority for that proposition. The Court's
willingness to create a splintered decision, thus, implies a lack of enthusiasm for
the Due Process Clause.
135. Id. at 544 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
136. Id. at 549.
137. Id. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 553-554.
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Logic indicates that if the only basis on which the Coal Act is chal-
lenged is the claim that it violates the Takings Clause and the Due
Process Clause, and the law violates neither, it must be constitutional.
Nonetheless, the aggregation of the differing opinions leads to the ir-
rational result that the Coal Act is unconstitutional, even though a
majority of the Justices, albeit a different majority, finds it passes con-
stitutional muster under each of the challenged provisions. The con-
sequences flowing from Eastern Enterprises's irrationality have been
quite troubling. As one court of appeals noted with considerable un-
derstatement, "[t]he splintered nature of the Court makes it difficult
to distill a guiding principle .... "139
Several courts have held that because there were five votes against
finding a taking absent government action affecting a specific prop-
erty interest, the case "makes clear that plaintiffs must first establish
an independent property right before they can argue that the state
has taken that right without just compensation." 140 Other courts
have assumed, the opposite, that the plurality's view that an extreme
retroactive law can violate the Takings Clause simply by requiring a
large payment, "is entitled to some persuasive precedential effect
"141
Further, courts have split over whether Eastern Enterprises al-
tered or reaffirmed the proper method for analyzing whether retroac-
tive laws violate substantive due process. Some have concluded that
there is a new, stricter test for retroactive laws: "To the extent that
Eastern embodies principles capable of broader application, we believe
that due process analysis encompasses the relevant concerns." 14 2 Ac-
cordingly, the court ruled, "Instead of relying solely on the length of
the retroactivity, we assess the relationship of the retroactively im-
posed liability to the governmental interests asserted in its de-
fense."143 Other courts, viewing Eastern Enterprises in a different
139. Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 658 (3d Cir. 1999).
140. Parella v. Retirement Bd. of R.I. Employee's Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 58 (1st Cir.
1999); see also Unity Real Estate Co., 178 F.3d at 659 ("[W]e are bound to follow
the five-four vote against the takings claim in Eastern ... ."); accord Holland v.
Big River Minerals Corp., 181 F.3d 597, 606 (4th Cir. 1999).
141. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 49 F. Supp. 2d 96, 99 (N.D.N.Y. 1999);
see also Pittsburg County Rural Water Dist. No. 7 v. City of McAlester, 358 F.3d
694, 718 (10th Cir. 2004) ("When a regulation adjusts the benefits and burdens of
certain economic action to promote the common good, such regulation may in cer-
tain circumstances effect a taking."); Anker Energy Corp. v. Consolidation Coal
Co., 177 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 1999) (analyzing retroactivity by noting that "[tihe
plurality also found the lack of proportionality significant in its analysis of
whether the Coal Act substantially interfered with Eastern Enterprises' reasona-
ble investment backed expectations, and whether the nature of the governmental
action was unusual").
142. Unity Real Estate Co., 178 F.3d at 659.
143. Id. at 670.
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manner, have found that the result reaffirms the Court's reluctance to
utilize the Due Process Clause in such circumstances: "[We take seri-
ously the Eastern Enterprises plurality's cautionary words about em-
ploying the Due Process Clause to invalidate economic legislation
"144
Thus, the irrational decision of Eastern Enterprises has, not sur-
prisingly, left multiple inconsistent interpretations in its wake. The
next section explores several proposals for how the legal system
should deal with irrational opinions.
IV. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT
IRRATIONAL DECISIONS?
The inevitability of irrational outcomes has led theorists to con-
trive various schemes for preventing these decisions from arising. Un-
fortunately, however, in each case, the proposed cure is arguably
worse than the ailment.
A. Bush v. Gore: A Case of Disingenuous Voting?
One way to avoid an irrational result would be for one or more Jus-
tices to change their vote so that the votes on the individual issues are
consistent with the result of the case. 145 Before considering whether
Justices should change votes, the following discussion explores a par-
ticular instance where some Justices may have done just that.
It appears that a fear of creating an irrational opinion may have
contributed to the unusual alignment of votes in Bush v. Gore,146
which marked the end of the disputed 2000 presidential election. In
that case, the Supreme Court was presented with three issues involv-
ing the Florida Supreme Court's order for a manual recount of dis-
puted ballots: (i) whether the Florida Supreme Court established new
standards for resolving Presidential election contests, thereby violat-
ing Article II, Section 1, Clause 2, of the United States Constitution;
(ii) whether the use of standardless manual recounts violated the
Equal Protection Clause; and (iii) whether, in the event there was an
equal protection violation, the safe-harbor date provided in the federal
election statute precluded the possibility of a constitutional recount.
144. Ass'n of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246, 1258 (D.C. Cir.
1998); accord Alcan Aluminum Corp., 49 F. Supp. 2d at 100.
145. See generally Rogers, I Vote This Way, supra note 29; Stearns, Should Justices
Ever Switch Votes, supra note 29.
146. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Professors Michael Abramowicz and Maxwell L. Stearns
have similarly concluded that the decision of Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas to join the per curiam decision reflected their desire to
avoid having to "decide a landmark case involving a presidential election ...
based upon a set of rationales that simple counting could disclose not to support
the judgment." Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 22, at 1939.
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In order to stop the recount, the Court needed to rule "yes" on either
question (i) or on both questions (ii) and (iii).
In a per curiam opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices Scalia, Thomas, O'Connor, and Kennedy, the Court ruled that
the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court violated the Equal
Protection Clause, because it failed to "satisfy the minimum require-
ment for non-arbitrary treatment of voters."14 7 According to the
Court, the Florida recount would have been conducted by various local
election boards determining the validity of the ballots absent "specific
rules designed to ensure uniform treatment."148 Because different
boards would likely use different standards, a ballot that was counted
as valid in one county might well be considered invalid elsewhere.
The Court held that by permitting this differential treatment, the
Florida Supreme Court violated "its obligation to avoid arbitrary and
disparate treatment of the members of its electorate."1 4 9 Because it
concluded that there was insufficient time for a revised recount before
the safe-harbor date expired, the Court concluded that no recount
could be held.
The per curiam opinion did not address the merits of the Article II
claim, that is, that the Florida Supreme Court had impermissibly es-
tablished new standards for resolving presidential election contests.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, wrote a concurring opinion, joined
by Justices Scalia and Thomas, stressing that while they "join the per
curiam opinion," the Article II claim provides "additional grounds that
require us to reverse the Florida Supreme Court's decision."15 O
The four dissenting Justices, Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Souter, all found no violation of Article II. Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg also found no violation of equal protection. Justices Breyer
and Souter found that the differential counting of ballots violated the
Equal Protection Clause, but both concluded that there was sufficient
time for an appropriate recount.
Of all of the mysteries surrounding the Bush decision, one of the
more provocative is why the three concurring Justices signed onto the
per curiam equal protection analysis, when Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices Scalia and Thomas had previously favored a far more
restrictive reading of the Equal Protection Clause. 15 1 For example, in
147. Bush, 531 U.S. at 105.
148. Id. at 106.
149. Id. at 105.
150. Id. at 111 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
151. See, e.g., Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 22, at 1928 ("[Tjhe equal protection
analysis appears to be in tension with the general jurisprudence of these three
conservative jurists, and that includes the issue of voting rights."); Bradley W.
Joondeph, Bush v. Gore, Federalism, and the Distrust of Politics, 62 OHIo ST. L.J.
1781, 1827 (2001) ("The per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore embraced a novel and
rather expansive understanding of equal protection that seems largely out of
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M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,152 Justice Thomas wrote in a dissent which was
joined by Rehnquist and Scalia, that "the Equal Protection Clause
shields only against purposeful discrimination." 15 3 It is therefore sur-
prising to find these same three Justices joining the per curiam opin-
ion in Bush which applies a heightened form of scrutiny, even though
no one was subject to purposeful discrimination or harm.154
In addition, the standard announced in the per curiam opinion was
not one traditionally used by the Court.155 That government must
"avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment of the members of its electo-
rate," had never previously been utilized in a voting rights case. 15 6
The three concurring Justices have often displayed downright hostil-
ity for what they term "newly minted" standards. 157 Nonetheless,
character for the Rehnquist Court."); Sanford Levinson, The Return of Legal Re-
alism, 272 THE NATION Jan. 8/15, 2001, at 8, 8 ("How can one take seriously the
majority's claims that their award of the presidency to Bush is based on their
deep concern for safeguarding the fundamental values of equality? This majority
has been infamous in recent years for relentlessly defending states' rights against
the invocation of national legal or constitutional norms.").
152. 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (holding the Equal Protection Clause was violated when a
state conditioned the taking of an appeal from the termination of parental rights
on that parent's ability to pay record transcription costs).
153. Id. at 135 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
154. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May
Direct, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 616 (2001) ("In a word, the Florida scheme is
devoid of any suspect classification needed to trigger the equal protection
analysis.").
155. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985).
The Court in City of Cleburne described the three traditional standards employed
in equal protection cases:
The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related
to a legitimate state interest .... The general rule gives way, however,
when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin ....
[T]hese laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if
they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest .... Legis-
lative classifications based on gender also call for a heightened standard
of review .... A gender classification fails unless it is substantially re-
lated to a sufficiently important governmental interest.
Id.
156. See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 22, at 1939 n.109 (noting that an online
search in the Westlaw Supreme Court cases database showed that the phrase
"arbitrary and disparate treatment" as a test for a violation of equal protection
had never appeared in a Supreme Court case); Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore
Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1721, 1727 (2001)
("The majority's equal protection rationale creates entirely new law."); Jamin B.
Raskin, What's Wrong with Bush v. Gore and Why We Need to Amend the Consti-
tution to Ensure It Never Happens Again, 61 MD. L. REV. 652, 678 (2002) ("[N]o
doctrinal foundation existed for what the conservative Justices did in Bush v.
Gore.").
157. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 944
(1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ('The joint
opinion, following its newly minted variation on stare decisis, retains the outer
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there was no criticism that the per curiam opinion had created and
applied such a newly minted standard.
The mystery, then, is why the three Justices signed onto the per
curiam opinion when it contained constitutional analysis which they
would normally vigorously oppose. It is especially curious given that
the same result would have been reached had they not signed onto the
reasoning of the per curiam opinion. As stated earlier, to reverse the
decision of the Florida Supreme Court and end the recounting process,
it would have been sufficient to rely on either the Equal Protection
Clause or Article II. Thus, if the three who signed the concurring
opinion had voted to reverse the Florida court solely on Article II, the
result would have been the same: five votes to end the recount
immediately.
The answer may be that Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
Scalia and Thomas feared taking a path that might foster a perception
that the President of the United States had been "selected" by an irra-
tional decision. Indeed, an irrational decision would have arisen had
the other two Justices who signed the per curiam opinion, Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor, explicitly rejected their Article II argu-
ment.158 Such a rejection is far from fanciful; reporters covering the
case disclosed that these two Justices refused to sign an opinion
drafted by Chief Justice Rehnquist which focused on the Article II
claim.159
Thus, had Justices Kennedy and O'Connor supported the equal
protection claim and rejected the Article II claim, while Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Thomas supported the Article II
claim but rejected the equal protection argument, the result would
have been the classic irrational decision: a majority voting in favor of
respondent Gore on every relevant issue, yet the Court ruling in favor
of petitioner Bush. The following chart displays this alternative
result: 160
shell of Roe v. Wade ... but beats a wholesale retreat from the substance of that
case. "). This opinion was joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and White.
158. It has been reported that Justice Kennedy authored the per curiam opinion. See,
e.g., DAVID A. KAPLAN, THE ACCIDENTAL PRESIDENT 284-85 (2001); Jeffery Rosen,
In Lieu of Manners, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 4, 2001, at 46, 50.
159. See Linda Greenhouse, Election Case a Test and a Trauma for Justices, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2001, at Al. Ms. Greenhouse reports that Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's draft had been intended as the majority opinion, but "failed to get the
support of Justices Kennedy and O'Connor." Id. Instead "[t]hey drafted their
own opinion, concluding that the standardless recount violated the guarantee of
equal protection." Id.
160. The chart of the actual decision of Bush looks like this:
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Author of opinion Did the Florida Su- Did the use of Should recount
and number of Jus- preme Court estab- "standardless" re- be stopped?
tices joining the lish new election counts violate equal
opinion standards in viola- protection?
tion of Art. II?
O'Connor + No (2) Yes (2) Yes (2)
Kennedy (2)
Rehnquist (3) Yes (3) No (3) Yes (3)
Breyer (2) No (2) Yes (2) No (2)
Stevens (2) No (2) No (2) No (2)
TOTAL No 6-3 No 5-4 Yes 5-4
Considering the public's reaction when the opinion was issued, one
can only imagine the ridicule the Court might have sustained had it
issued a demonstrably irrational opinion. 16 1 Thus, it is plausible to
conclude that perhaps Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia
and Thomas chose what they saw as the lesser of two evils: signing
onto an equal protection analysis with which they did not fully agree,
Author of opin- Did the Florida Did the use of Assuming an Should re-
ion and num- Supreme Court "standardless" equal protection count be
ber of Justices establish new recounts violate violation, did stopped?
joining the election stan- equal protec- safe harbor date
opinion dards in viola- tion? preclude a re-
tion of Art. II? count?
Per Curiam (5) Not Say (5) Yes (5) Yes (5) Yes (5)
Rehnquist (3) Yes (3) Not Say (3) Not Say (3) Yes (3)
Breyer (2) No (2) Yes (2) No (2) No (2)
Stevens (2) No (2) No (2) No (2) No (2)
TOTAL No 4-3 Yes 7-2 Yes 5-4 Yes 5-4
This is obviously not an "irrational" decision, because a majority supported a res-
olution of the equal protection argument in such a way that it squares with the
Court's outcome.
161. See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 22, at 1939 n.328. Abramowicz and
Stearns state:
[Aibsent the apparent vote switch by the Rehnquist camp, a complaint
that six Justices rejected the proposition that there was an equal protec-
tion problem demanding reversal and that six Justices rejected the pro-
position that the Florida Supreme Court had effected an
unconstitutional change in Florida election law would have been both
easy to understand and powerful. Whether or not the Justices con-
sciously recognized the potential existence of an issue voting anomaly,
they presumably would have intuitively understood the likelihood of
criticism of a disposition that lacks majority support for either of the two
logically plausible, and agreed upon, rationales supporting a reversal.
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rather than issue an irrational decision to resolve one of the most po-
litically sensitive cases to arise in the last fifty years.
As a regular practice, such a method of avoiding irrational results
presents some problems. First, it is of primary importance that Jus-
tices be honest about their reasoning. As one federal district judge
has declared: "The requirement that the judiciary be candid is per-
haps absolute."16 2 The most obvious reason for this requirement is
the Court's "moral obligation of candor.163 One need not research
the law to understand that Justices should not deceive the public.
There are also practical reasons why Justices should not pretend to
hold different opinions than they do in reality. First, candor is neces-
sary to promote "the public accountability of judges and to stimulate
judicial reflection and self-control."164 One of the main benefits of
published opinions is that they prevent Justices from basing decisions
on "unprincipled" grounds. 16 5 In the words of Professor Deborah
Hellman: "Candor thus acts as a prophylactic; the requirement of pub-
licity insures that the reasons on which decisions are based are at
least minimally acceptable to the public .... [Publicity] will prevent
the judge from endorsing views that others perceive as wildly
illegitimate."16 6
Second, a Court's deception is bound to be suspected, sooner or
later,167 and the belief that Justices have not been honest in their
published opinions "destroys their credibility."168
Finally, disingenuous voting creates misleading precedent. Taking
the Bush example, imagine the dilemma facing a lower court the next
time there is an equal protection challenge to a recount decision.
Lower courts must follow the majority's per curiam opinion, and apply
its novel standard: to be constitutional, a state must ensure that local
election boards "avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment of the mem-
bers of its electorate."16 9 Upon review, however, that standard faces
possible rejection by the very Court that announced it. If indeed Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Thomas did not truly agree
162. Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 687 F. Supp. 1061, 1062 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
163. David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519, 556
(1988).
164. Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 667 (1983).
165. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 205 (1985).
166. Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 ARIz. L. REV.
1107, 1143 (1995).
167. See David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARv. L. REV. 731, 737
(1987) ("[Llack of candor seldom goes undetected for long, and its detection only
serves to increase the level of cynicism about the nature of judging and of
judges.").
168. GuIDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 175 (1982); see also
Hellman, supra note 166, at 1127 ("[A] judge ought to avoid acting in a way that
is likely to compromise the perceived integrity of the judiciary.").
169. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000).
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with the per curiam's equal protection analysis, they might well vote
with Justices Stevens and Ginsburg in the future, thereby returning
to the traditional equal protection standard of rational review. The
public would then be left facing unequal application of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.
* B. The Limits of Disclosed Vote Switching
Some of these problems might be mitigated were a Justice to
openly declare that, despite his or her determination of the relevant
issues, he or she is voting for the other party to prevail. Such candor
has occurred where a Justice switches his or her vote to produce a
majority judgment where none of the possible judgments-affirmance,
reversal, or remand-will otherwise receive a majority. 170 However,
Justices can also switch votes to prevent the Court's opinion from be-
ing irrational.
Consider the case of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.171 That case
presented two issues: (i) whether Congress intended the Superfund
law to permit private suits against the states for damages; and (ii)
whether Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to per-
mit such suits. Union Gas needed to win on both of these issues to win
the case. A majority of Justices found that Congress did intend the
law to permit such private suits, while a different majority found that
Congress had the requisite power. However, there were five Justices
170. See Stearns, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes, supra note 29, at 110. Professor
Stearns describes several cases where a Justice switched votes to produce a ma-
jority judgment. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 656 (1998) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (casting vote to remand rather than affirm and producing majority
judgment); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 608 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part)
(casting vote to vacate and remand to produce a majority judgment); Connecticut
v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 89-90 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (casting vote to
affirm to produce majority judgment); Md. Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 423
(1954) (plurality opinion) (voting to remand to produce majority); Klapprott v.
United States, 335 U.S. 601, 619 (1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring) (voting to re-
mand to produce majority); Von Moltke v Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 726-27 (1948)
(plurality opinion) (observing that two concurring Justices have agreed to break
deadlock by voting with plurality to remand, rather than voting to reverse);
Screws v United States, 325 U.S. 91, 134 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring)
(switching vote to remand).
There are strong institutional reasons for a Justice to switch his or her vote to
enable resolution of the case with a majority vote on the judgment. See Edward
A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 643, 672 (2002) (stating that because of a "judgment impasse ... a vote
switch is therefore appropriate"). Justice Rutledge explained, "Stalemate should
not prevail for any reason, however compelling, in a criminal cause or, if avoida-
ble, in any other." Screws, 325 U.S. at 134 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
171. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). See
infra note 176.
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who individually believed either that Congress did not intend the law
to permit such private suits, or that Congress lacked the power to do
so. Had all the Justices voted consistently with their individual rea-
soning, an irrational result would have occurred. Union Gas would
have prevailed on every issue, but Pennsylvania would have won the
case. 17 2 To avoid this result, Justice White compromised, stating that
despite his belief that Congress did not intend the law to permit such
private suits, he would defer to the majority who believed Congress
did so intend.173 Accordingly, a majority voted in favor of Union Gas
and White's switch averted an irrational result, since Union Gas pre-
vailed on every issue and also won the case.174
There have been only three cases, including Union Gas, where a
Justice has admitted to switching votes to prevent the Court from is-
172. The following chart shows the voting outcome in the event the Justices had each
voted according to their individual assessment of the issues:
Author of opinion Did Congress au- Does Congress have Can Union Gas
and number of thorize suits for the constitutional sue Pennsylvania?
Justices joining damages against authority to author-
the opinion states in the ize such suits?
superfund law?
Brennan (4) Yes (4) Yes (4) Yes (4)
Rehnquist (3) No (3) No (3) No (3)
Scalia (1) Yes (1) No (1) No (1)
White (1) No (1) Yes (1) No (1)
TOTAL Yes 5-4 Yes 5-4 No 5-4
Technically, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not "author" an opinion in this case.
Rather, he, along with Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, signed onto part of Jus-
tice Scalia's opinion and part of Justice White's indicating that three of them
believed that Congress did not intend the law to permit such private suits and
that Congress lacked the power to do so.
173. Justice White wrote:
My view on the statutory issue has not prevailed, however; a majority of
the Court has ruled that the statute, as amended, plainly intended to
abrogate the immunity of the States from suit in the federal courts. I
accept that judgment. This brings me to the question whether Congress
has the constitutional power to abrogate the States' immunity. In that
respect, I agree with the conclusion reached by Justice Brennan in Part
III of his opinion, that Congress has the authority under Article I to ab-
rogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States ....
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 56-57 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
174. The actual vote was as follows:
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suing an irrational opinion.175 Doubtless, such conduct ensures a "ra-
tional" result in a particular case and helps produce clear holdings on
the underlying issues of the case. 176 Nonetheless, vote-switching
presents its own set of problems. First, a Justice who switches votes
to prevent an irrational result, by that very act, is guilty of irrational
reasoning.S7 7 In Union Gas, Justice White in effect declared both that
Congress did not intend the Superfund law to permit private suits
against the states for damages and that Pennsylvania could be sued
under the Superfund law.
A second problem is that the vote-switching Justice controls the
outcome of the case unilaterally. This is not the same as a "swing"
Author of opinion Did Congress au- Does Congress Can Union Gas
and number of thorize suits for have the constitu- sue Pennsylvania?
Justices joining the damages against tional authority to
opinion states in the authorize such
superfund law? suits?
Brennan (4) Yes (4) Yes (4) Yes (4)
Rehnquist (3) No (3) No (3) No (3)
Stevens (1) Yes (1) No (1) No (1)
White (1) No (1) Yes (1) Yes (1)
TOTAL Yes 5-4 Yes 5-4 Yes 5-4
175. The other two cases were Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), and United
States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971). In Fulminante, there were three issues:
whether the confession was coerced; whether harmless error analysis applies to
the admission of a coerced confession; and whether the admission of the confes-
sion in this case was harmless. Although Justice Kennedy believed the confes-
sion was not coerced (and thus the conviction should be valid), because a majority
found otherwise, he voted to reverse the conviction on the ground that its admis-
sion was not harmless. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 313-14. In Vuitch, the Court
faced two issues: whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the govern-
ment's appeal; and whether the statute in question was unconstitutionally vague.
Even though Justices Harlan and Blackmun believed the Supreme Court did not
have jurisdiction (and thus the government should lose the case), because a ma-
jority found otherwise, they voted that the government should win the case on the
ground that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague. Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 93
(Harlan, J., dissenting as to jurisdiction.). See generally Kornhauser & Sager,
The One and the Many, supra note 29; Stearns, Should Justices Ever Switch
Votes, supra note 29.
176. There is some question, however, as to how firm the holdings of vote-switch cases
really are. When overruling the constitutional holding of Union Gas seven years
after it was announced, the Court declared: "Reconsidering the decision in Union
Gas, we conclude that none of the policies underlying stare decisis require our
continuing adherence to its holding. The decision has, since its issuance, been of
questionable precedential value, largely because a majority of the Court ex-
pressly disagreed with the rationale of the plurality." Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at
66.
177. Professor Rogers refers to this as "individual inconsistency." Rogers, I Vote This
Way, supra note 29, at 474.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Justice who affects the outcome of a case when his or her determina-
tion of a particular issue coincides with one group of Justices or an-
other.178 Rather, vote switching permits one Justice to control the
outcome by the individual selection of one voting procedure or an-
other. As Professors Kornhauser and Sager note, such procedural de-
cisions "ought to be a matter of articulate and reflective practice, not
the private impulse of each Justice."179
Finally, there is no governing principle for when it is appropriate
for a Justice to switch votes. It has been suggested that in the few
vote-switching cases, individual Justices were motivated by the prece-
dential importance of the issue which became the Court's holding due
to their vote.'S 0 Such a practice could lead to retaliatory vote switch-
ing to defeat the scheme.1s1 For example, in Union Gas, Justice
Scalia voted that Congress did intend the law to permit such private
suits, but that Congress lacked the requisite Constitutional power. If
Justice Scalia had been more concerned about the constitutional issue,
and if he felt that Justice White was inappropriately "gaming the sys-
tem," he could have altered his vote to find Congress did not intend
the law to permit private suits. This second vote-switch would create
a majority for the proposition that there was no statutory authority for
the suit, and thus the Court would not reach the constitutional issue.
Such a system that permits, let alone encourages, such unprincipled
manipulation should not be welcomed in a democratic society. 8 2
C. The Futility of Changing Voting Protocols
Some scholars have argued that group irrationality should be cur-
tailed by requiring Justices to decide cases by voting directly on each
issue in each case, rather than voting merely on the outcome.' 8 3
178. For example, the Court by a five to four vote ruled that Congress could not au-
thorize private law suits for damages against the state under title I of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), see Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), but by another five to four vote the Court ruled
Congress could authorize private law suits for damages against the state under
title II of the ADA, see Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). The only vote that
changed between the decisions was the "swing vote" of Justice O'Connor.
179. Kornhauser & Sager, The One and the Many, supra note 29, at 24.
180. Stearns, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes, supra note 29, at 149.
181. Professor Rogers states that such vote switching will "undermine respect for the
courts." Rogers, I Vote This Way, supra note 29, at 475.
182. Such "voting against one's own conclusions," in order to achieve a desired out-
come, is sometimes termed "strategic voting." Id. at 468; see also Abramowicz &
Stearns, supra note 22, at 1932 (stating that "principled" means "nonstrategic").
183. Issue voting is different from what Professor Delson has termed "voting by part."
B. Rudolph Delson, Typography in the U.S. Reports and Supreme Court Voting
Protocols, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1203, 1218 (2001). Voting by part occurs when a
"Justice joins one part of another Justice's opinion without joining that opinion in
its entirety." Id. By contrast issue voting is the protocol under which the Court
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David Post and Steven Salop have described this system in terms of a
preference for "issue voting," as opposed to "outcome voting."18 4 One
advantage of issue voting is that cases involving collective irrational-
ity will still produce usable precedent. For example, if the Court in
Miller had voted by issue, there would have been a clear seven to two
majority in favor of finding standing, at least a five to two majority
finding that the Court has the power to grant the relief requested, and
a likely majority of at least five to two in favor of striking down the
distinction as unconstitutional sex-based discrimination. These three
holdings would then be treated as usable precedents, for lower courts
as well as future Supreme Court decisions.
One problem with issue voting, however, is that the definition of
what is an "issue" is not always self-evident. Frequently there is more
than one way to define the relevant issues and sub-issues needing res-
olution.18 5 For example, the question of whether a statute should be
interpreted in a way that favors a particular party might be subdi-
vided into narrower questions such as: (i) whether the plain language
of the statute indicates who should prevail; or (ii) whether the stat-
ute's legislative history demands a particular interpretation.186 Rea-
sonable people may disagree.
A second problem with issue voting is that it does not prevent the
thwarting of a majority's will. In fact, issue voting can lead to a situa-
tion where not only is the will of the majority thwarted, but the will of
every Justice is frustrated. To illustrate, consider a hypothetical
American citizen, captured in Afghanistan, and held as an enemy
combatant without a hearing.187 Assume that in order for the govern-
ment to prevail, Congress must have authorized the detention. Next,
assume the government has declared it will have to release the de-
tainee if ordered to hold a hearing, because a hearing will require the
disclosure of material harmful to national security. Thus, in order for
the government to continue to hold the detainee, the Court must find
that when Congress authorizes a detention, no due process hearing is
required. Assume also that in order to continue holding the detainee,
votes on each issue necessary to resolve a case, and then reaches its conclusion
based on those votes. Id.
184. Post & Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater, supra note 29, at 744. They prefer
the hyphenated phrases of "issue-voting" and "outcome-voting," but for simplic-
ity, this Article drops the hyphen. Note that some commentators prefer the
phrase "issue by issue voting." See, e.g., Delson, supra note 183, at 1204.
185. See, e.g., Kornhauser & Sager, The One and the Many, supra note 29, at 49 ("To
resolve a controversy issue by issue, the judges must agree on what constitutes
an issue."); Rogers, Issue Voting, supra note 29, at 1002.
186. Nash, supra note 29, at 128.
187. This example is derived from Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). Although
the voting patterns of the actual case differ somewhat from those in the hypothet-
ical, the Court in that case was badly divided on several of the issues raised in the
case.
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the government must show that the detention does not violate the Ge-
neva Convention.
Now, assume that the Court is divided into three camps. A group
headed by Justice O'Connor and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, vote for the following: (i) Congress
authorized the detention; (ii) when Congress authorizes a detention, a
due process hearing is required; and (iii) detention does not violate the
Geneva Convention. Thus, four Justices vote that the detainee must
be released because a hearing before a neutral forum must be held for
the detention to be valid.
Next, assume that a group headed by Justice Scalia and joined by
Justices Stevens and Thomas, vote as follows: (i) Congress did not au-
thorize the detention; (ii) when Congress does authorizes a detention,
a due process hearing is not required; and (iii) detention does not vio-
late the Geneva Convention. Thus, because they concluded that Con-
gress did not authorize the detention, these three Justices vote that
the detainee must be released.
Finally, assume that Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
votes that: (i) Congress did authorize the detention; (ii) when Con-
gress does authorize a detention, a due process hearing is not re-
quired; and (iii) detention does violate the Geneva Convention. Thus,
because they concluded that the detention does violate the Geneva
Convention, these two Justices vote that the detainee must be
released.
Under the current system of outcome voting, all of the Justices find
that the detention is unlawful and the detainee must be released. If
the Court utilized issue voting, however, the case would turn out very
differently. A majority of Justices would have found for the govern-
ment on each issue:
ISSUE VOTE COUNT
(i) Congress authorizes the detention O'Connor (4) + Souter (2) = 6 votes
(ii) A due process hearing is not Scalia (3) + Souter (2) = 5 votes
required
(iii) The detention does not violate the O'Connor (4) + Scalia (3) = 7 votes
Geneva Convention
Under an issue voting system, the government would win the case
because it prevailed on each issue. This would lead to the remarkable
situation where the detainee who brought the case would remain in
detention, despite the fact that every single Justice believed he should
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be released. If not irrational, such a result would certainly be deemed
unjust.188
The reason both traditional outcome voting and issue voting can
create such illogical results appears to be that, under either regimen,
a disconnect arises between the group's collective reasoning (as re-
flected by majority vote on individual issues) and the group's collective
result (as reflected by majority vote on the result). The voting protocol
itself does not cause the problem; it is inherent in the nature of collec-
tive decision-making. Faced with this incurable possibility, one won-
ders what techniques, if any, can best ameliorate the problem.
Some commentators have suggested adopting more complex voting
protocols. For example, Professors Kornhauser and Sage propose the
use of a "metavote," whereby Justices faced with an irrational decision
vote on whether to use issue voting or outcome voting in that particu-
lar case.18 9 The primary advantage to such a system is that the Jus-
tices decide together which is more important to preserve in that
case-the judgment or the resolution of the issues. 190 However, the
same divisions within the Court causing irrationality will frequently
render the metavote meaningless. Returning to the case of Eastern
Enterprises, it would be surprising to find Justices who were troubled
enough by the retroactive application of the Coal Act to find it uncon-
stitutional, opting for issue voting which would not only permit the
Act to stand but would generate holdings that the Act does not offend
either the Takings Clause or the Due Process Clause. As Professor
Jonathan Nash points out, because there are multiple factors to con-
sider during a metavote, the metavote may yet lead to an irrational
result.191 Thus, the metavote is subject to the same dangers as the
current system.
Nash proposes an even more complicated hybrid system that at-
tempts to draw a bright line between what he terms a "pure question
188. This hypothetical is derived from a similar one offered by Professor Rogers. See
Rogers, I Vote This Way, supra note 29, at 472-73. He imagined a capital case
where four Justices voted that an execution was barred by the Fifth Amendment
but not the Eighth Amendment, while four other Justices voted that the execu-
tion would violate the Eighth Amendment but not the Fifth Amendment. Under
issue voting, if the sole remaining Justice voted that neither provision barred the
execution, there would be a five to four majority for finding neither amendment
was violated. Thus, if issue voting were utilized, the defendant would be exe-
cuted, despite the fact that eight of the nine Justices believed the execution was
unconstitutional. In the words of Professor Rogers, "This result cannot be right."
Id. at 473.
189. Kornhauser & Sage, The One and the Many, supra note 29, at 30.
190. See id. at 57. They suggest different factors that appellate courts could use in
making their metavotes, including, inter alia, the comparative importance of the
issues versus the outcome, the avoidance of path dependence, and whether the
case involves the appeal of serious criminal convictions. See id. at 33-41.
191. Nash, supra note 29, at 142.
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of law" and an "application of law to fact."192 At the risk of over-sim-
plifying his proposal, Nash suggests that outcome voting be used to
establish the appropriate legal standard governing a particular cause
of action. He then proposes that application of law to fact under that
standard be determined separately using issue voting.193 If there is a
disagreement in the Court over which voting protocol to use, a "true
metavote may be required to resolve the controversy."194
Nash's proposal presents several difficulties. First, the line be-
tween a "pure question of law" and an "application of law to fact" is not
always bright. Recall in Miller that one of the issues was whether the
Equal Protection Clause was violated by a federal law imposing differ-
ent rules for obtaining citizenship for illegitimate children who had
only one American citizen parent, depending on the sex of the citizen
parent. Justice Stevens stated that such distinctions are constitu-
tional because they meet the standard that "normally governs gender
discrimination," which he describes as "substantially related to impor-
tant governmental objectives."19 5 He cited United States v. Vir-
ginia1 96 for support of this standard.19 7 By contrast, Justice Breyer,
citing the same case, stated that the law violated equal protection be-
cause it lacked, "the 'exceedingly persuasive' support that the Consti-
tution requires."'198 It is thus not clear whether the issue of whether
the law violates equal protection is a "pure question of law"-deter-
mining the appropriate standard for judging gender discrimination
cases-or an "application of law to fact"-applying an agreed upon
standard to the facts of the case. 19 9
It is also not clear whether there would be agreement as to what
issues are being voted on. For example, Nash states that the Supreme
Court's opinion in Apodaca v. Oregon,200 "ultimately raised only a sin-
gle issue of pure law-whether the Constitution requires a unanimous
192. Id. at 149-50.
193. Id. at 148. Nash also states that issue voting should be utilized for "arguments
that would constitute independent appeals were interlocutory appeals permissi-
ble. Each of these arguments should be afforded separate votes." Id. at 147.
194. Id. at 150.
195. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 434 n.11 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring).
196. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
197. Miller, 523 U.S. at 434 n.11 (Stevens, J., concurring).
198. Id. at 472 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 530).
199. In fact, this question arose in United States v. Virginia. Justice Ginsburg, writ-
ing for the majority, stated that she was merely summarizing "the Court's cur-
rent directions for cases of official classification based on gender." Id. at 532. By
contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist complained that by stating that the govern-
ment must demonstrate an "'exceedingly persuasive justification' to support a
gender-based classification ... the Court thereby introduces an element of uncer-
tainty respecting the appropriate test." Id. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
200. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
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jury verdict for a criminal conviction to stand in state court."20 Con-
versely, every Justice voting in the case saw two issues needing reso-
lution: (i) whether the same standard applies to state and federal
criminal trials; and (ii) whether a unanimous jury was required in fed-
eral criminal trials.202 Finally, because Nash's voting protocol is una-
ble to prevent the occurrence of irrational outcomes, it seems unlikely
that any court would choose to adopt such a complicated system.
Thus, while there are benefits associated with each proposed
change in voting protocol, none provide a solution to the problem of
irrational decisions. Thus the problem is destined to remain.
D. Irrational Solutions
1. Tinkering Around the Edges
Even though it is impossible to eliminate irrational opinions, there
are certain steps that can be taken at the margins to make things
better. One step would be for Justices who see that an irrational opin-
ion is looming to avoid discussing issues that are unnecessary for
reaching their decision as to who should prevail. In Miller, for exam-
ple, once Justices O'Connor and Kennedy had decided that the plain-
tiff lacked standing, they had, in effect, decided that she should lose
the case. There was no need for them to discuss the merits of the sex
discrimination claim. Similarly, there was no need for Justices Scalia
and Thomas to discuss standing once they decided that the Court
could not issue the requested remedy. Thus, had all these Justices
stopped when they had resolved the issue which decided the case for
them, there would have been no change in the result of the case. The
plaintiff still would have lost. Had they not voiced their views, how-
ever, there would not have been a majority deciding in favor of the
losing party on the issues. There would not have been an irrational
Court decision. Put differently, when dealing with potentially irra-
tional opinions, "[t]he better part of valour is discretion." 203
Another possibility for dealing with irrational opinions focuses on
those issued by lower-level appellate courts. John Nash suggests the
Supreme Court should be especially willing to accept petitions for cer-
201. Nash, supra note 29, at 153.
202. Nash's plan, in fact, would prohibit Justices from breaking the issue into sub-
issues: "The proposal directs that pure issues of law not be decomposed." Id. at
153. For an analysis of the Court's actual voting pattern in Apodaca, see infra
Part VI.
203. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST PART OF THE HISTORY OF HENRY THE FOURTH
act 5, sc. 4. It may be that some Justices believe it is important for lower courts
to be able to see the number of Justices with a particular viewpoint on a disputed
substantive question, such as the correct standard for dealing with sex discrimi-
nation. If so, they may conclude that the value of presenting that viewpoint, even
in an irrational opinion, outweighs the confusion created by such opinions.
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tiorari for cases involving irrational opinions by lower appellate courts
to eliminate confusion. 2O4 This makes eminent sense, but, of course,
cannot address the Supreme Court's own irrational opinions.
2. Living with Irrationality
Ultimately, as long as society utilizes multi-member courts, it will
be impossible to eliminate the possibility of irrational appellate opin-
ions. Rather than rail at the dilemma wrought by the imperfections of
our system, however, we should recognize that these imperfections are
simply part of the inherent limitations of humanity. Law is not the
only intellectual discipline to confront such limitations.
Chaos theory, for example, is based on the realization that there
are certain relatively basic systems in biology, physics, and mathe-
matics for which long-range prediction is impossible. 20 5 The difficul-
ties exposed by chaos theory can be illustrated by calculating the
population density of a tiny insect which increases when food is plenti-
ful but decreases during times of overcrowding. Because of a phenom-
ena known as "sensitive dependence on initial conditions,"2o 6 even the
slightest errors in calculating the starting density will, over time, lead
to extraordinarily erroneous results. Moreover, any change along the
way will render the initial prediction meaningless. This is sometimes
termed the "butterfly effect," because an act as seemingly insignificant
as a butterfly flapping its wings can theoretically change the weather
around the world, though of course we can never know in what
way. 20 7 The humbling lesson of chaos theory is that such systems are
destined to remain unpredictable. As one theorist noted: "We cannot
204. Nash, supra note 29, at 157-58. Nash similarly suggests that when an interme-
diate appellate court panel generates an irrational opinion, the full court should
tend to grant en banc review. Id. at 157.
205. One should not assume that the rigorous field of chaos theory can be applied
directly to fields such as law. Chaos theory is technically defined as "the qualita-
tive study of unstable aperiodic behavior in deterministic nonlinear dynamical
systems." STEPHEN H. KELLERT, IN THE WAKE OF CHAOS 2 (1993). The formal
mathematics necessary to a complete understanding of chaos theory can be quite
daunting to the non-mathematician. See, e.g., ROBERT L. DEVANEY, INTRODUC-
TION TO CHAOTIC DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS (2d ed. 1989). For an accessible telling of
the development of chaos theory, see JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS (1987). See generally
MICHAEL I. MEYERSON, POLITICAL NUMERACY 185-208 (2002); Edward S. Adams,
Gordon B. Brumwell & James A. Glazier, At the End of Palsgraf, There Is Chaos:
An Assessment of Proximate Cause in Light of Chaos Theory, 59 U. PITT. L. REV.
507 (1998); Mark R. Brown, Weathering Constitutional Change, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1091 (2000); Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution: The
Web of Law, Management Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium,
66 TENN. L. REV. 137 (1998); J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the
Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-up Call for Legal Reductionism and
the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996).
206. DEVANEY, supra note 205, at 50.
207. See JOHN L. CASTI, COMPLEXIFICATION 89 (1994).
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blame this failure on the influence of unknown factors, because there
are none. It is rather the result of our own terminal inability to mea-
sure or represent the present with infinite precision."20 8
A similarly humbling experience is derived from examining the
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle of quantum physics fame. 20 9 Sim-
ply put, Werner Heisenberg discovered in 1927 that it was impossible
to determine precisely both the position and the momentum of a sub-
atomic particle, such as an electron, because the light needed to iden-
tify the position of the particle alters its momentum. 2 10 Thus, the
more we know about the particle's position, the less we know about its
momentum. 2 11 Since one needs to know both the position and mo-
mentum of a particle to determine where it will be in the future, the
Uncertainty Principle indicates that we can never predict precisely
the future location of these particles. As Steven Hawking wrote, "one
certainly cannot predict future events exactly if one cannot even mea-
sure the present state of the universe precisely."2 12 Once again, this
is not a failure of human effort but a limitation imposed by nature. 2 13
A final example of such limitation is demonstrated in Kurt G6del's
"Incompleteness Theorem."2 14 In 1928, a leading mathematician of
the twentieth century named David Hilbert, issued a challenge to the
208. Franco Vivaldi, An Experiment with Mathematics, in EXPLORING CHAOS 33, 41
(Nina Hall ed., 1991).
209. For an English translation of Heisenberg's discussion of the Uncertainty Princi-
ple, see WERNER HEISENBERG, THE PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE QUANTUM THE-
ORY (Carl Eckhart & Frank C. Hoyt trans., 1930). For an accessible and lawyer-
friendly description of the Uncertainty Principle, see Laurence H. Tribe, The Cur-
vature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn From Modern Physics,
103 HARv. L. REV. 1, 17-19 (1989); see also DAVID CASSIDY, Heisenberg, Uncer-
tainty and the Quantum Revolution, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, May 1992, at 106.
210. According to Heisenberg, once "the electron has been pushed by the light quan-
tum, it has changed its momentum and its velocity, and one can show that the
uncertainty of this change is just big enough to guarantee the validity of the un-
certainty relations." WERNER HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY: THE
REVOLUTION IN MODERN SCIENCE 47-48 (1958).
211. See Tribe, supra note 209, at 17 ("According to Heisenberg, the more accurately
you measure where a particle is, the less accurately you are able to measure
where it's going.").
212. STEPHEN HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME: FROM THE BIG BANG TO BLACK
HOLES 55 (1988).
213. See R. George Wright, Should the Law Reflect the World?: Lessons for Legal The-
ory from Quantum Mechanics, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 855, 859 (1991)
("[MI athematics or nature itself, rather than our physical disturbance of the sys-
tem, underlies the uncertainties in the simultaneous measurement of those
variables.").
214. The formal proof can be found in Kurt Gddel, On Formally Undecidable Proposi-
tions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems I, in GODEL'S THEOREM IN
FoCus 17, 30 (S. G. Shanker, ed., 1988). For a non-technical explanation of the
Incompleteness Theorem, see DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN
ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID (1979); MORRIS KLINE, MATHEMATICS: THE Loss OF CER-
TAINTY 258-68 (1980); MEYERSON, supra note 205, at 162-66. See generally Mike
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mathematical community. He asked if anyone could create a complete
formal logical system, one that would be able to prove or disprove any
mathematical hypothesis. Two years later, Godel proved that no such
system could ever be created because within the system envisioned by
Hilbert, there would always be true mathematical statements that
were unprovable. 2 15 Such systems are thus fated to be incomplete.
According to mathematician Rudy Rucker, "[olur world is endlessly
more complicated than any finite program or any finite set of
rules."2 1 6
The same limitations on perfectability that are seen in chaos the-
ory, the Uncertainty Principle, and the Incompleteness Theorem, are
inherent in irrational opinions. However, just as these theories do not
prevent scientists and mathematicians from making important discov-
eries and solving difficult problems, neither does the possibility of ir-
rational opinions prevent the courts from resolving most cases
rationally. When an irrational opinion does arise, it can be viewed as
a lesson in human limitations, a particularly important lesson for
judges and lawyers. As one philosopher of science has suggested,
"[w]hy not honestly admit.., fallibility, and try to defend the dignity
of fallible knowledge from cynical scepticism, rather than delude our-
selves that we can invisibly mend the latest tear in the fabric of our
'ultimate' intuitions?"217
V. CONCLUSION
The key to understanding truly irrational court opinions is to rec-
ognize the confounding aspects of group decision-making. It is a major
mistake to treat "appellate court decisions as if they were the act of a
single judge."21 8
Nonetheless, not every problem that afflicts group decision-making
in theory will be relevant to our judicial system. As discussed earlier,
Townsend, Implications of Foundational Crises in Mathematics: A Case Study in
Interdisciplinary Research, 71 WASH. L. REV. 51, 118-19 (1996).
215. In greatly simplified terms, G~del found a way to put into mathematical notation
a version of the "Liar's Paradox." The "Liar's Paradox" involves the sentence,
"This statement is false." The problem arises because if we deem the statement in
quotes to be "false" then it is by definition true. However, if we term the state-
ment in quotes "true," then it becomes false. Thus, the truthfulness or falsity of
the statement cannot be determined. See MEYERSON, supra note 205, at 164-65;
see also Giuseppe Dari Mattiacci, Godel, Kaplow, Shavell: Consistency and Com-
pleteness in Social Decision-Making, 79 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 497, 515 (2004).
216. RuDY RuCKER, MIND TOOLS 247 (1987).
217. KLINE, supra note 214, at 316-17.
218. Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Juris-
diction Opinions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 75, 123 (1998) (quoting Post & Salop, Rowing
Against the Tidewater, supra note 29, at 743).
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Arrow's Impossibility Theorem will not be a serious source of problem
for our courts.
By contrast, group decision-making leads to the unavoidable possi-
bility of truly irrational opinions, those in which a majority of Justices
vote that one party prevails on all relevant issues, but that party still
loses the case. These opinions stand as testaments, not to individual
fallibility, but to inevitable imperfections to which all human endeav-
ors, including our judicial system, are subject.
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VI. APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL IRRATIONAL CASES
1. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
A majority of the Justices voted that a state ban on all use of sound
trucks violated the First Amendment. A different majority voted that
the New Jersey law in question did ban all sound trucks. Nonethe-
less, the Court found the law constitutional.
Author of opinion Does a state ban on Does the N.J. law Does the N.J. law
and number of all sound trucks vi- ban all sound violate the First
Justices joining the olate the First trucks? Amendment?
opinion Amendment?
Reed (3) Yes (3) No (3) No (3)
Frankfurter (1) No (1) Not Say (1) No (1)
Jackson (1) No (1) Yes (1) No (1)
Black (3) Yes (3) Yes (3) Yes (3)
TOTAL Yes 6-2 Yes 4-3 No 5-3
2. National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S.
582 (1949).
Congress passed a law vesting federal district courts with diversity
jurisdiction over suits between citizens of states and the District of
Columbia. The only two possible constitutional bases for this law
were Article I and III. A majority of the Justices voted that Article I
did not give Congress this power, and a different majority voted that
Article III did not give Congress this power. Nonetheless, a majority
of the Court voted that Congress had this power.
Author of opinion Does Art I permit Does Art III permit Can Congress to
and number of Congress to vest di- Congress to vest di- vest diversity juris-
Justices joining the versity jurisdiction versity jurisdiction diction over suits
opinion over suits between over suits between between citizens of
citizens of states citizens of states states and the Dis-
and the District of and the District of trict of Columbia?
Columbia? Columbia?
Jackson (3) Yes (3) No (3) Yes (3)
Rutledge (2) No (2) Yes (2) Yes (2)
Vinson (2) No (2) No (2) No (2)
Frankfurter (2) No (2) No (2) No (2)
TOTAL No 6-3 No 6-3 Yes 5-4
3. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
A defendant challenged his conviction for willful failure to pay
taxes on funds which he illegally embezzled. A majority of Justices
voted the funds must be treated as taxable income, while a different
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majority voted that the defendant willfully failed to pay taxes on those
funds. Nonetheless, the Court voted that the defendant could not be
tried for willfully failing to pay taxes on the funds.
Author of opinion Are embezzled Did the defendant Can the defendant be
and number of funds taxable willfully refuse to charged with failure to
Justices joining income? pay taxes on em- pay taxes on embezzled
the opinion bezzled funds? funds?
Warren (3) Yes (3) No (3) No (3)
Clark (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1)
Harlan (2) Yes (2) Yes (2) Yes (2)
Douglas (2) No (2) Yes (2) No (2)
Whitaker (1) No (1) No (1) No (1)
TOTAL Yes 6-3 Yes 5-4 No 6-3
4. National Labor Relations Board v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S.
759 (1969).
The NLRB ordered an employer to provide a list of its employees'
names to a union seeking to organize the employees. In an earlier
adjudication involving different parties, the NLRB had announced a
prospective rule that required employers to provide such a list. A ma-
jority of the Justices voted that the earlier rule was invalid as the
NLRB did not have discretion to promulgate rules in adjudicatory pro-
ceedings. A majority also ruled that without formal rule-making pro-
ceedings, such a requirement could not be imposed in the instant case.
Nonetheless, the Court voted the employer was required to make the
employee list available.
Author of opinion Does NLRB rule, an- Can NLRB impose Must employer
and number of nounced in prior adjudi- requirement that give list of em-
Justices joining catory proceeding, that employers give list ployees to
the opinion employers give list of of employees to union?
employees to union bind union in this case
future employers? without rule-mak-
ing procedures?
Fortas (4) No (4) Yes (4) Yes (4)
Black (3) Yes (3) No (3) Yes (3)
Harlan (1) No (1) No (1) No (1)
Douglas (1) No (1) No (1) No (1)
TOTAL No 6-3 No 5-4 Yes 7-2
5. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
A criminal defendant was convicted based in part on hearsay evi-
dence. A majority of the Court voted that the Confrontation Clause is
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violated if hearsay evidence which creates "a real risk of impairing the
accuracy of the truth-determining process" is admitted. A different
majority voted that the evidence in the defendant's case created such a
risk. Nonetheless, the Court voted that admitting the hearsay evi-
dence did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
Author of opinion Is Confrontation Did the hearsay ev- Was the Confronta-
and number of Clause violated by idence in this case tion Clause violated
Justices joining admission of hear- create a "real risk" by admission of
the opinion say evidence which of inaccurate fact- hearsay evidence in
creates a "real risk" finding? the instant case?
of inaccurate fact-
finding?
Stewart (4) Yes(4) No (4) No (4)
Harlan (1) No (1) Yes (1) No (1)
Marshall (4) Yes (4) Yes (4) Yes (4)
TOTAL Yes 8-1 Yes 5-4 No 5-4
6. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
A criminal defendant was convicted in a state court with a less
than unanimous verdict. A majority of the Court voted that a unani-
mous jury was required in federal criminal trials and a different ma-
jority voted that the same standard applies to both state and federal
criminal trials. Nonetheless, the Court voted that a unanimous jury
was not required in state criminal trials.
Author of opinion Is a unanimous ju- Does the same Is a unanimous ju-
and number of ry required in fed- standard apply in ry required in state
Justices joining the eral criminal tri- state and federal criminal trials?
opinion als? criminal trials?
White (4) No (4) Yes (4) No (4)
Powell (1) Yes (1) No (1) No (1)
Stewart + Douglas Yes (4) Yes (4) Yes (4)(4)*
TOTAL Yes 5-4 Yes 8-1 No 5-4
* The two opinions of Justices Stewart and Douglas, were both joined by Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall. The relevant opinions are found in both Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404 (1972), and Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
7. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759
(1972).
Cuba brought suit against a bank regarding a loan. The bank
counter-claimed that Cuba seized its property. A majority of the
Court found the "act of state" doctrine generally precludes judicial re-
view when a foreign government takes property within its borders.
Different majorities also found (i) there is no exception when the Pres-
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ident attempts to authorize jurisdiction, and (ii) there is no exception
for counter-claims. Nonetheless, a majority found that the Court had
jurisdiction.
Author of opin- Can Court gen- Can the Presi- Is there an Does the Court
ion and number erally hear case dent authorize exception for have jurisdic-
of Justices join- when foreign jurisdiction in counter- tion?
ing the opinion government such cases? claims?
seizes property
within its own
territory?
Rehnquist (3) No (3) Yes (3) Yes (3) Yes (3)
Douglas (1) No (1) No (1) Yes (1) Yes (1)
Powell (1) Yes (1) Not Say (1) No (1) Yes (1)
Brennan (4) No (4) No (4) No (4) No (4)
TOTAL No 8-1 No 5-3 No 5-4 Yes 5-4
8. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
An injured worker filed a second worker's compensation claim in
Washington, D.C., after receiving an award in Virginia. There were
two competing precedents: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S.
430 (1943), which had held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
barred a second suit; and Industrial Commission v. McCartin, 330
U.S. 622 (1947), which permitted second suits unless the first state
had a statute with "unmistakable language" barring such suits. A
majority of the Justices voted to overrule McCartin. A different ma-
jority voted that Magnolia should not be overruled. Nonetheless, the
Court voted to permit the second suit.
Author of opinion Can an injured Does the first state Can this injured
and number of worker bring suit have the right to worker bring suit
Justices joining the in a second state bar a second suit in a second state?
opinion without regard to only by "Unmistak-
the Full Faith and able Language"?
Credit Clause?
Stevens (4) Yes (4) No (4) Yes (4)
White (3) No (3) Yes (3) Yes (3)
Rehnquist (2) No (2) No (2) No (2)
No 5-4 No 6-3 No 6-3 Yes 7-2
9. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
A majority of the Court concluded that disparate impact, without
proof of discriminatory intent, was enough to violate the regulations
promulgated under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A different
majority concluded that compensatory damages should be available
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for violations of regulations promulgated under title VI. Nonetheless,
the Court voted that compensatory damages would not be available
for violations of regulations promulgated under title VI if there is only
a showing of disparate impact, absent proof of discriminatory intent.
Author of opinion Are compensatory Is disparate impact Are compensatory
and number of damages available sufficient to violate damages available
Justices joining for violations of the regulations for violations of reg-
the opinion regulations promulgated under ulations promulgat-
promulgated under title VI? ed under title VI if
title VI? only disparate im-
pact is shown?
White (1) Yes (1) No (1) No (1)
Powell (3) No (3) No (3) No (3)
O'Connor (1) No (1) Yes (1) No (1)
Marshall (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1)
Stevens (3) Yes (3) Yes (3) Yes (3)
TOTAL Yes 5-4 Yes 5-4 No 5-4
10. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
The biological father of a child whose mother was married to, and
cohabiting with, another man at time of the child's conception and
birth, sued under California law for visitation rights. A majority of
the Justices voted that a state may not constitutionally deny a hearing
on visitation rights to the biological father of such a child. A different
majority voted that California law denied such a hearing. Nonethe-
less, the Court voted that the California law denying the biological
father a hearing was constitutional.
Author of opinion Can a state deny a Does California law Is California law
and number of biological father a permit a hearing on constitutional?
Justices joining hearing on visiting visiting child if
the opinion child if mother was mother was married
married to, and co- to, and cohabiting
habiting with anoth- with another man,
er man, at, child's at, child's conception
conception and and birth?
birth?
Scalia (4) Yes (4) No (4) Yes (4)
Stevens (1) No (1) Yes (1) Yes (1)
Brennan (3) No (3) No (3) No (3)
White (1) No (1) No (1) No (1)
TOTAL No 5-4 No 8-1 Yes 5-4
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11. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990).
The Supreme Court ruled in American Trucking Association v.
Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987), that an unapportioned flat highway use
tax violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. Subsequently in Smith,
a majority of the Justices voted that Scheiner had been properly de-
cided, and a different majority voted that non-criminal constitutional
rules should be applied retroactively. Nonetheless, the Court voted
that Scheiner should not be applied retroactively.
Author of opinion Was Scheiner prop- Should constitu- Should Scheiner be
and number of erly decided? tional decisions be applied retroactive-
Justices joining the applied retroactive- ly?
opinion ly?
O'Connor (4) Yes (4) No (4) No (4)
Scalia (1) No (1) Yes (1) No (1)
Stevens (4) Yes (4) Yes (4) Yes (4)
TOTAL Yes 8-1 Yes 5-4 No (5-4)
